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A SHRIMP AMONG WHALES:  
POLICES AND NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1950-1976

by

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B.S. United States Air Force Academy 1964-1968

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of

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
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## INTRODUCTION

The modern history of Korea has been characterized by the intrusion of foreign powers who have exercised direct control or, at a minimum, strong influence over the affairs of the country. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), terminating with the Treaty of Simonoseki in April 1895, resulted in the recognized "independence" of Korea from Chinese authority. A decade later, the Russo-Japanese War was brought to an end in September 1905 by the Treaty of Portsmouth as Japan successfully defeated the second rival that harbored real designs on Korea. Among other provisions, the Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japan's predominant interests in Korea and effectively stopped further Russian moves to gain preeminence on this vital extension of the Asian mainland until the end of World War II.

Japan's efforts to gain control of the Korean peninsula did not cease with the recognition of their "predominant interests" in Korea. Before the Treaty of Portsmouth had been signed in September, a secret agreement between the United States and Japan had been concluded. This Taft-Katsura Agreement of July 1905 provided that the United States would approve of Japanese suzerainty over Korea in return for a Japanese renouncement of "any aggressive designs whatsoever on the Philippines." By 1910 the Japanese felt sufficiently secure in their strength and position in the Far East to annex Korea outright. Thus, from 1910 to the conclusion of the Pacific War in August 1945 Korea was an integral part of the Japanese colonial empire.



In the last days of World War II, as a result of an agreement reached at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Russian troops entered the northern part of Korea and in accordance with General MacArthur's General Order No. 1 of August 1, 1945, accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces occupying that area north of the 38th Parallel. While the partitioning of Korea into two zones was originally envisioned as only a temporary measure, the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to arrive at a satisfactory accommodation resulted in a hardening of the status quo and ultimately resulted in the formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August 1948 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK--North Korea) the following month. Once again the population of the Korean peninsula had been denied their independence, and further, they had now been witness to the political division of the country into two segments that were rapidly becoming increasingly estranged. By analyzing the events that have transpired since the division of the Korean nation we may perceive the import and ramifications of these earlier decisions and actions that resulted in the partitioning of the peninsula.

The purpose of this treatise is twofold. First, the ensuing discussion will be undertaken to delineate and analyze the major national interests and vital factors associated with the development of the foreign policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the period just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1950 and traces them through

*The author first outlines and analyzes*  
*The autumn of 1976. (cont on p. 3)*



the autumn of 1976. The manner in which this task is to be accomplished is to divide this history into three distinct time periods corresponding well with major turning points of North Korean policy as it has undergone some of its more fundamental shifts in direction. The periods are: 1950-59; 1960-69; and, 1970-76. Each period will be examined in terms of the KPRK's role and maneuverings within the Communist world, economic and military policies that it has implemented, and its interactions with the Republic of Korea and the other non-Communist nations that are directly involved in affairs on the peninsula. Greater emphasis of discussion and analysis will be placed on the contemporary period since 1970. This review of two and a half decades of North Korean foreign policy will provide an underlying basis of knowledge needed to examine and consider the tenets of the second objective of this paper.

➤ The second purpose of this study is to assess the degree of influence/control that the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union are able to exercise over the actions of North Korea, and to delineate the nature of that possible control in terms of economic, political and military factors. A certain by-product of this examination will be an assessment of which of the two Communist superpowers--China or Russia--in fact holds greater sway in controlling events on the Korean peninsula. Of even greater import, however, is the possibility of uncovering clues that may serve to answer the one question relating to Korea which is of overriding

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By examining the past, it may be possible to determine whether

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importance: would the North Koreans <sup>are likely to</sup> resort to overt aggression to ~~try and~~ effect a military reunification of the Korean peninsula? Analysis of the past <sup>26</sup> twenty-six years of the foreign and reunification policies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reveals characteristics and trends which may <sup>well</sup> provide these vital clues.

A

## CHAPTER I

## The Years 1950-59

North Korea and Communist Bloc Politics

On the morning of June 25, 1950 North Korean forces moved across the 38th Parallel into South Korea. The decision to resort to military force to effect a reunification of the divided Korean peninsula reflected a basic appraisal by the North Korean leadership under Kim Il-sung that methods short of open conflict could not be relied upon to reunite the country. This decision to employ force, with all the attendant risks that it entailed, was made largely on the basis of Soviet and North Korean assumptions regarding the probable nature of an American response.

During 1948 and 1949 the resistance of the Nationalist Government in China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek collapsed. While the final military mopping-up operations were still under way, the People's Republic of China was formed on October 1, 1949. The developing cold war attitudes in Europe fostered the American policy of containment which, as the Communist Chinese came to power and relations with the U.S. could not be normalized, soon came to be applied in the Far East as well.

The delineation of the American defense perimeter in the Far East by General MacArthur on March 2, 1949, was further amplified by Secretary of State Acheson on January



12, 1950 in his famous "Crisis in China" speech before the National Press Club in Washington. In the course of the portion of the speech devoted to matters of military security, he laid out the strategic line that the United States would be prepared to defend. That line ran southward from the Aleutian chain through Japan, down to the Ryukyu Islands and eastward to the Philippines. Highly significant in this delineation, and not to go unnoticed, was the exclusion of both Formosa and Korea from within the bounds of the U.S. perimeter. The exclusion of Korea was to have decisive ramifications on events to follow.

One month before this speech, in mid-December 1949, Mao Tsetung arrived in Moscow to begin an extensive period of negotiations with the Soviets to resolve questions of mutual interest and settle the details of a new relationship that would bind the two Communist nations. The Chinese and Soviet thirty-year treaty of military and political alliance that was signed by the two nations and issued on February 14, 1950 provided the basis of this new relationship. Of prime significance in this new treaty was a change in wording of the text of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty in that part dealing with defense.

Under the terms of the 1945 treaty executed between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Government of China, either of the two countries was bound to come to the assistance of the other if attacked by Japan. Under the terms of the new treaty, however, this portion was changed



to include attack "By Japan or any state allied with it." This change in emphasis was a frank consideration of the new threat posed by the United States presence in the Far East. Japan, badly defeated in World War II, disarmed and now under the reins of the U.S. occupation, was in no position to present a viable military threat. The wording of the new treaty, then, in effect demarked the U.S. as Japan's aggressive surrogate.

While the origins of the Korean War are still incompletely known and the ultimate motives a speculation, there are several considerations that may have been prime moving factors in generating the hostilities. As mentioned earlier, the internal question of Korean reunification was undoubtedly a factor of great importance. As Allen S. Whiting speculates in his work China Crosses the Yalu other factors may have been: a desire to damage the image of Western (particularly American) power in Asia, with a secondary objective of destroying support for the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan; prevent Japan from once again reestablishing a foothold on mainland Asia by turning the Korean peninsula Communist, with a secondary objective of damaging the United States-Japan relationship; and finally, possibly aid in creating a de facto division of Asia into spheres of interest for the two Communist powers. Moreover, in furthering the world Communist revolutionary movement, a North Korean military success, following close on the heels of the successful Chinese Communist revolution, would

further strengthen Peking's claims that "new turning-point in history" had arrived.<sup>1</sup> While any or all of these factors would directly further the interests of the People's Republic of China, it appears that actual planning for the military action and its initiation were a product of Soviet and North Korean efforts.<sup>2</sup>

In the years following the beginning of the Soviet occupation in 1945, North Korea had become a Soviet "satellite" nation in the fullest sense. Soviet forces had installed Kim Il-sung, a relatively minor Korean national who had risen to the rank of major in the Soviet army, as Premier of the DPRK. Other Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry were also installed in positions of power.

Soviet troop presence until the end of 1948, large numbers of Soviet specialists, technicians, advisors and party officials assigned throughout the government, the military, and economic sectors insured that the Soviets exercised tight control over the nation, particularly in the political processes. North Korean dependence on Soviet arms, supplies and petroleum products insured Soviet control over any military action that might be contemplated. In the political arena, consolidation of power was taking place as both the indigenous Korean Communists and the Korean Communists who had lived in exile in China during the Japanese occupation (the Yen-an faction) were being systematically removed from power or influence.

The conduct and eventual outcome of the war in Korea had profound impact on the view of the Communist world held by the North Koreans, most particularly by their leader Kim Il-sung. The rapid reversal of battlefield success as the North Koreans nearly succeeded in sweeping the Republic of Korea (ROK) and American forces off the peninsula, and then were in turn routed after MacArthur's Inchon landing in mid-September with the subsequent drive to the Yalu, presented immense challenges to the decision-makers in both the PRC and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was patently unwilling to become involved in a major land war with the United States in Asia, particularly with extended and vulnerable lines of communication extending the length of the U.S.S.R., and the latter having at its disposal a growing nuclear arsenal in addition to a conventional capability to interdict these lines of supply and fight a war. China, evidently alarmed by the American lack of response to Chinese warnings not to proceed north of the 38th Parallel in their approach to the Yalu, perceived an immediate threat to her security, particularly the important Manchurian region. The earlier miscalculation by the Soviets and North Koreans that the U.S. would not intervene in Korea since it fell outside the proclaimed defense perimeter, now lent an element of uncertainty to the Chinese Communists as they weighed past American actions and sought to understand what possible actions the United Nations forces under American control would take as they



continued to advance northward to the Yalu despite the Chinese warnings.

In mid-October the Chinese decided to commit troops to Korea and the first elements of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu in support of the shattered North Korean forces. Following the great counteroffensive of November 26th the U.N. forces were driven southwards. In the ensuing months attack and counterattack ensued until in spring the front stabilized roughly along the 38th Parallel, where, with minor changes, it would stay until the 1953 armistice.

The Chinese decision to enter the war most likely was the result of a number of considerations. Undoubtedly of great importance was an unwillingness to see the North Korean regime destroyed with all the ramifications that such a defeat would pose to the new Communist regime in China in particular, and the world-wide Communist movement in general. Another major consideration was centered around Chinese uncertainty of United Nations (American) motives as these forces came closer to realizing the reunification of Korea under non-Communist control and with statements coming out of the United States that intimated that invasion or bombing of China was a strong possibility. Additionally, Korea has traditionally been a vassal state of China and "While the DPRK emerged within the Soviet sphere of influence, it clearly remained, as throughout its



history, within the Chinese sphere of interest."<sup>3</sup> These considerations, in combination with pressures or inducements from Moscow, may be speculated--in the absence of direct evidence from the Soviets and Chinese--to have been the major factors influencing the decision for involvement.

The major impact of this course of events, beyond the fundamental aspect that Chinese intervention was instrumental in preserving the North Korean state, was the creation of a psychological, if not outright tangible, debt by the North Koreans to the Chinese people for their blood sacrifice. While the North Korean leadership would not deny the vital nature of the military supplies, munitions and equipment that the Soviets provided to equip the remaining North Korean forces and the Chinese "volunteers," there did emerge from this period a certain sense of betrayal as the Soviets would not supply direct assistance in the nature of troops, and as a result of the actions of the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations (Malik) as he made efforts in June 1951 to effect an armistice. On the other hand, a bond of considerable psychological significance between the Chinese and the North Koreans was forged. From this period to the present, Korean and Chinese statements, communiques and publications continuously reflect this sentiment. For example, the tone of this Chinese statement, "'The two Parties and the two peoples of China and Korea have cemented with blood a great friendship and militant unity in their protracted common struggle against imperialist aggression,'"<sup>4</sup>

does not differ greatly in tone or content from the following statement made by Kim Il-sung in 1961:

[T]he Chinese people are our comrades-in-arms who have shared joys and sorrow, life and death with us in long revolutionary struggles. The Chinese people shed their own blood to aid us at the time of our people's Fatherland Liberation War against the armed invasion of U.S. imperialists. The militant friendship and solidarity firmly established between the Korean and Chinese peoples through their joint struggle against the common enemy are continually being consolidated.<sup>5</sup>

While not wise to overestimate the concrete value of sentiment in the relations among nations, there is reason to believe that the events of the Korean War did create a closer bond based on commitment and similarity of interests between the Chinese and the North Koreans than exists between the Soviets and Koreans.

The ties between China and North Korea became increasingly close in the post-war period. The presence of Chinese troops in the country until the end of 1958 was a continuing tangible expression of the Chinese commitment. In addition, the Chinese provided generous amounts of aid to assist in the post-war reconstruction, at a time when the Chinese themselves were desperately in need of capital for economic development at home.

Although the Chinese had, through their direct involvement in the war and the post-war economic, political and military assistance, been successful in reducing the influence of the Soviet Union, North Korea was still primarily oriented politically and economically towards the

U.S.S.R. The degree of political orientation and economic dependence had shifted however. From a wholly-dependent satellite of the Soviets, North Korea had now emerged as a viable party-state "oriented toward the Soviet Union, but also open to more varied integrative relationships with other Communist countries, especially China."<sup>6</sup> The cautious moves in this direction had been made possible directly as a result of the war which had seen the Chinese replace the Soviets in direct commitment and allowed Kim Il-sung and the returned Communists associated with the guerrilla movement against Japan to consolidate their position as the controlling factor in delineating the orientation of North Korean policy.

The North Koreans now launched into a two-pronged but closely integrated program. Recognizing after three years of warfare that armed struggle, at least in the near future, would not provide a solution to the problem of reunification, the North Koreans now turned to a policy of relatively peaceful competition with the capitalist southern half of the nation. Their aim was to reconstruct and then build a highly-developed modern socialist society that would illustrate to the world the superiority of their system over capitalism. The 1954-56 Three Year Plan for postwar economic reconstruction followed by the Five Year Plan (1957-61) of industrial development were the direct tools to be employed to accomplish these development ends.

The reversion to peaceful competition was not only a reflection of the futility of relying on warfare as a means



for policy realization at this time, but was also directly tied to the changing climate of the Communist world. As early as 1952 the seeds of change in Communist strategy had begin to sprout. At a major conference in Moscow in August and September a Chinese delegation led by Premier Chou-En-lai met with Soviet leaders to map out a grand strategy for Asia. Malenkov's report to the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress at Moscow and Stalin's monograph on "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," published in October 1952, emphasized the emerging concept of "peaceful coexistence."

Stalin's death in March of 1953 presented expanded opportunity to implement this developing policy. Communist moves to reach accommodation with the non-Communist world resulted in the Korean truce in July 1953 and similar results the following year for settlement in Indochina. The Bandung Conference in April 1955, the agreement reached in Warsaw the following month between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellite nations that they would not "interfere in the internal affairs of each other," and the reconciliation of differences in June with Tito as Moscow acknowledged Yugoslavia's right to determine its own method of socialist development, were all seen as manifestations of this policy. The Geneva "summit" meeting that same summer between President Eisenhower and the Soviet leaders underlined the changing Communist policies that were finally presented in polished form during the Twentieth Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in February 1956.



This developing policy of "peaceful coexistence" had immense implications for the Communist movements in Asia, particularly in China and North Korea. Mao's 1949 statement that all nations of the world must side with either the Communist or the non-Communist worlds (no such thing as "neutrality") had now given way to an embryonic concept of "third world" (in Western context) nations. The heretofore stringent Chinese requirement that uncommitted countries must make a definite choice between the Communist and imperialist camps was no longer an unconditional "must." For the time being, the policy of waging guerilla war against Asian regimes controlled by elements with strong nationalistic motives was shelved. The policy of "peaceful coexistence," implemented initially by the Soviet Union and backed by the Communist Chinese, ultimately was designed to allow the Communist camp time to engage in domestic consolidation and development.

The concept of "peaceful coexistence" and its practice, however, conjured different meanings in the Communist bloc and the Western world. In the Korean sense this policy took on tones decidedly different than the interpretation of the U.S., for instance. In the Western tense, this concept implied abjuring the use of force. But in the Korean context, the relationship between North and South, between the DPRK and the American presence, would be "Peaceful, yes, but coexistence, no, if this means placidly accepting the

indefinite division of the Korean peninsula."<sup>7</sup> In other words, overall peace would reign, but struggle up to the level of overt warfare would be used.

The primary goal of North Korean foreign policy was, and still remains, reunification of the two Koreas. Heavily dependant on the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent on the Chinese for economic and political support, the North Koreans were neither in a position to balk against the Soviet direction, nor inclined to do so because of the crying needs for peace in order to rebuild. There was the realization by the Pyongyang leadership, however, that after the termination of hostilities in Korea neither of North Korea's patrons were as concerned over the future of Korean reunification as the Koreans themselves. It is likely that after conclusion of the 1953 Armistice Agreement that Korean reunification was indeed a very low priority item in Soviet Policy.<sup>8</sup> This realization made imperative the need for the North Koreans to begin a disentanglement from the controls imposed on North Korean actions and policy by the Soviet Union and China. Movement toward a more independent line was an absolute must if the issue of reunification was to remain a viable one.

While elements of this latent desire for national independence had been present since the late 1940's, it was not until 1955 that the first cautious enunciations of this independent spirit were publicly heard. In a speech

entitled "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche [chuch'e] in Ideological Work" Kim laid the groundwork for the chuch'e principle most generally defined as national "self-reliance" or "national identity,"<sup>9</sup> a principle that expresses strong nationalistic connotations. His statement, "Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time to work out our own?" expresses the foundation of North Korea's emerging political, and economic, philosophy.

The elements of growing nationalistic expression were further amplified following the 20th CPSU in February 1956. The formal adoption by that congress of the "peaceful co-existence" policy that would produce the "thaw" in East-West relations at the same time carried with it, as a result of Khrushchev's secret speech inaugurating the "de-Stalinization" campaign, the elements of disarray that would in time split the Communist world.

The de-Stalinization policy, attacking as it did Stalin's policies and style of leadership, directly threatened the status and position of both Mao and Kim. Both Asian Communist leaders employed styles of leadership and policy that were closely analagous to that of Stalin, particularly the "personality cults" that had been carefully constructed around the persons of each of them. In both China and North Korea this Soviet campaign lent ideological support to those groups in opposition to Mao



and Kim. Thus, both Asian leaders faced both external pressure from the Soviet Union and domestic pressure from opposition elements as the de-Stalinization campaign in Russia impinged on affairs in China and North Korea.

For Kim, the attack on Stalin's personality cult was soon translated into severe domestic opposition when in August 1956 a leadership crisis erupted as a coalition of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP--the Communist Party of the DPRK) challenged Kim's policy of giving priority to the development of heavy industry during the Five Year Plan (1957-61).

The challenge to his leadership, in the form of an attack on his economic policies in this "August Factionalist Incident," threatened the economic development model that he envisioned. To Kim the most concrete expression of the chuch'e policy would be in the achievement of an economic system that could operate independently of both the Soviet Union and China. Only if North Korea could achieve economic independence could it grasp political independence as well.

To establish chuch'e in a country means to have an independent and self-sufficient economy....Only when we achieve self-sufficiency in our economy, can we become politically independent and able to build an advanced modern state.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, the constraint of the "peaceful coexistence" policy being pushed by Moscow and still adhered to by both China and the DPRK, would in time become inimicable to North Korean purposes of reunification because it did not allow sufficient room for maneuver against the continuing

U.S. presence on the peninsula by pulling the teeth of any threatened use of force against the South to achieve reunification or to effect a U.S. withdrawal.

Latent North Korean dissatisfaction with the principles of the "peaceful coexistence" policy mirrored the growing dissatisfaction of the Chinese. A slowdown in economic growth, the accompanying "Bloom and Contend" campaign in 1957 and the ensuing rectification campaign had produced a situation wherein the Chinese could not pursue the spirit of the Bandung Conference as fully as the Soviet Union by competing for influence abroad through the distribution of material aid at levels comparable to that of the Soviets. China was increasingly being reminded of its status as the poor brother of the Soviet Union, of being placed in an inferior status in the Communist camp.

Although Mao lauded the Soviet accomplishments as they fired their first ICBM and launched the first Sputnik when he arrived on his trip to Moscow in November 1957, and centered on the theme that "The East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind," he apparently was most skeptical of an obvious Soviet unwillingness to press home what he considered to be a significant strategic advantage over the West, if only a psychological one at this time. Mao's subsequent failure in his dealings with Khrushchev to obtain either substantial aid for China or to win a shift in policy that would pursue an offensive against "the failing capitalist world," further exacerbated the growing discontent with the

Soviet leadership's policies. Chinese failure to arrive at a consensus of opinion regarding a strategy outlook dealing with the Far East, and additionally, failure to negotiate additional Soviet aid for development resulted (after considerable policy debate within the Chinese leadership) in a decision to "go it alone," to attempt to thrust China's economy forward in a "great leap forward."

As relations between the Soviet Union and China began to cool, North Korea's relations still remained tightly bound to the Soviets while at the same time becoming increasingly close with the Chinese. At the conclusion of the meeting of the twelve ruling Communist parties in Moscow in October 1957, Kim wholeheartedly endorsed the Moscow Declaration which stressed the need for bloc unity and attacked "modern revisionism"--i.e., the defiant attitude of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Paradoxically, the North Koreans also viewed the Moscow Declaration as a "telling reaffirmation of the correctness of the Twentieth CPSU Congress...."<sup>11</sup> This statement most probably expressed an attempt to conciliate and promote bloc unity rather than indicate true feelings.

During 1958 a notable North Korean affinity for Chinese domestic policies was evident as the DPRK instituted an agricultural collectivization program closely akin to the Chinese commune movement and intensified the Ch'ollima Undong, or Flying Horse Movement (implemented at the Central



Committee Plenum in December 1956), an economic movement quite similar to China's Great Leap Forward. A PRC delegation led by Chou En-lai to Pyongyang in February worked out details for the evacuation of the remaining Chinese troops from Korea, thus assisting the DPRK's anti-U.S. policy by insuring a credible basis upon which to couch demands for the removal of all foreign (i.e., American) troops from the peninsula. Further evidence of the growing closeness of the DPRK and the PRC was indicated by a meeting in November and December between Mao and Kim, who in part pledged their determination to wage "an uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism" and strengthen "the unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union."<sup>12</sup>

The growing closeness of the DPRK with the PRC was complemented by the maintenance, and indeed expansion, of ties with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet rift was still in its opening phases and to this point there was no serious problem for Kim to retain rapport with both of his Communist neighbors. The first serious threat to this status quo was not long in coming, however.

The 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis and more important, the Sino-Indian border clashes of August-September 1959 made evident the increasing complexity of events that were overtaking the Communist world and the nebulous positions of some of the Communist bloc nations. During the course of the Sino-Indian clash North Korea backed the Chinese

position verbally while the Soviet Union remained neutral. While North Korea did not directly attack the Indian position, the situational Catch 22 was that since the Soviets had refused to back the Chinese and the North Koreans did, North Korea, by imputation, was prejudiced in favor of Peking, and was seen to have acted against the Soviet Union and its policy line. Although Kim was quick to demonstrate allegiance to the Soviets by hailing the up-coming proposed visit of President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union, the entire episode was wont to point out the delicate position that Kim was trying to hold and a harbinger of the difficulties that lay ahead in the future as North Korea strove to seek an independent line of action while simultaneously striving to alienate neither China nor Russia.

#### Economic Rehabilitation and Growing Independence

From the termination of hostilities in July 1953 through the end of the decade Kim heavily based his economic strategy of development and military posture on Soviet and Chinese aid. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities the Soviet Union, in September, allowed a 1-billion ruble grant (\$250 million) distributed between 1954 and 1956 to assist in rebuilding the war-ravaged North Korean economy. In November the Chinese signed an agreement with the North providing for economic and cultural cooperation over a ten-year period. Under the terms of this agreement, the Chinese cancelled all war debts incurred by the DPRK during

the Fatherland Liberation War (approximately \$72 million) and provided a grant of 8 trillion yuan (\$325.2 million) to be used over a four-year period for reconstruction and economic development.<sup>13</sup> The Chinese, through this generous out-pouring of economic assistance, were thus able to play a game of one-upsmanship over the Soviet Union by cancelling the wartime debt and granting an amount of aid initially greater than that provided by the Soviets. North Korea, whose gross industrial product in 1953 was only about 36%<sup>14</sup> of what it had been in 1949, required all the aid and assistance it could muster from the Communist bloc for reconstruction and recovery. In addition to these immediate post-war aid grants from the Soviet Union and the PRC, the Eastern European Communist bloc nations also contributed amounts estimated from approximately 620 million rubles<sup>15</sup> to 1130 million rubles.<sup>16</sup>

The economic plan laid out for the period 1954-56 was designed to resurrect the destroyed economy. Prior to the war the economy had been tightly integrated with the Soviet economy with primary exports of iron and steel, minerals and metallic ores to the U.S.S.R., while primary imports were petroleum products, chemicals, coal, machinery, spare parts and railroad equipment. Trade with the Soviets in 1950 had originally been projected to be more than three-quarters of North Korea's total foreign trade.<sup>17</sup> These details in brief provide basis for assertion that economically North Korea was indeed a Soviet satellite nation.



By the end of the decade Kim had made substantial gains in reversing this almost total economic dependancy on and linkage with the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, a growing economic independence would permit the development of political independence. Despite opposition from within the KWP, Kim pushed the development of heavy industry during the period of the 1954-56 Three Year Plan and again during the Five Year Plan (1957-61) in order to reach for this goal of self-sufficiency and independence. Additionally, emphasis was placed on diversifying industry and markets and in reducing dependence on foreign technicians or the need to train Koreans abroad. For example, from 1955 to 1957, trade with the Soviet Union decreased from 80.8% to 57.0% of the total while trade with China increased from 9.0% to 27.3%.<sup>18</sup>

During the period from 1954-60 the primary objective of the North Korean economy was to effect a recovery from wartime conditions and lay the foundation for a modern industrialized socialist soviet. The wherewithal to accomplish these tasks was largely forthcoming from the massive aid programs of North Korea's Communist partners and from the agricultural sector. In agriculture the initial land reform movement and the first moves towards collectivization of agriculture in 1953-54 were signs of an awareness of the importance of this sector to national development, particularly in the future as aid from outside sources came to be

less and less certain in coming. The foremost goal of these efforts, as evidenced by Kim's 1955 speech, was the development of an economy that was fully in accord with the nationalistic aspirations of the North Korean leadership.

#### The Non-Communist Challenge

Economic development towards self-sufficiency implied a growing capability by the DPRK to provide for its own national security. The easing of tensions in Korea following the termination of hostilities and adoption of the "peaceful coexistence" principle permitted the beginning of a Communist military drawdown. In a proposal unveiled at Geneva in April-June 1954, North Korea sought to ease tensions with the South and initiate measures to provide for at least a minimum degree of contact between the two Korean states. Additionally, Pyongyang called for the withdrawal of all "foreign" troops from Korea and proposed that the two sides reduce their armed forces to a maximum of 100,000 men within a year--a call that would be repeated again and again in the future.

These proposals were influenced by the Chinese decision to unilaterally withdraw troops from the peninsula, a move with a planned completion by the end of 1955. By the end of October 1955 the Chinese had already withdrawn some 140,000 men and it was only in response to the urgent request of Kim Il-sung that the remaining troops were not withdrawn until late in 1958.<sup>19</sup> The request was deemed necessary by

Kim because of an acute concern with the rapid decline in Communist military strength. Although the continued Chinese military presence complicated his political demands for the removal of all "foreign" troops, he was, to judge from the events, more concerned with national security than with the political difficulties engendered by their presence. In the South, the effectiveness of the ROK forces was continuously on the rise with the infusion of American arms and aid, and time for training and reorganization. The U.S. presence, although steadily declining from Korean War peaks, was still highly significant as troop levels approximated 50,000 men in 1958 and 1959.<sup>20</sup>

Of some comfort to Kim must have been the slow rate of economic recovery taking place in the South. Economic growth was desulatory during the first stage from 1954-57 largely because of government corruption, runaway inflation and outright incompetence. During the second stage of economic growth, from 1958 to 1961, significant steps were taken to control the rate of inflation and stabilize the economy. At the expense of accepting a decrease in Gross National Product (GNP--from 6% in the first stage to 4% in the second stage<sup>21</sup>) wholesale prices were stabilized for the first time since the war.

If the southern regime's relative lack of success in moving the economy provided some cheer for Kim, other developments in Asia, particularly the American relationship



with Japan certainly gave him no cause for happiness. While the U.S. occupation of Japan gave way to a treaty relationship following signature of the Japanese peace treaty in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, with its attendant mutual security treaty, the conditions of these treaties, particularly the security pact, tightly bound Japan to the general tenets of American Far East policy.

This developing alliance relationship between Japan and the United States was of critical importance to North Korea. Japan had occupied Korea for forty years with notably harsh rule. The United States, intervening in Korea, was seen in North Korean eyes as the arch villain who had on two occasions (the original demarcation of Korea and the Korean War) been responsible for insuring the continued division of the peninsula. Further, U.S. containment of Communism in the Far East was not just containment of Communist China but the DPRK as well, with all the political, social, and economic ramifications issuing out of this enforced isolation. Finally, the possibility that the United States might allow or even encourage a Japanese rearmament in building strong anti-Communist forces in the Far East was a crucial threat, since "The recognition of Japanese sovereignty with the conclusion of the peace treaty implied the right to rearm; and indeed the Korean War emphasized American desires that it be done."<sup>22</sup> Faced not only by a U.S. presence in South Korea, a growing ROK military capability bolstered by the 1953 U.S.-

South Korea defense pact (signed October 1, approved for ratification of the U.S. Senate January 26, 1954), the North also saw the grave threat emanating from a resurgent Japan. Fear of Japan's growing strength and influence would become even more real in the 1960's and 1970's as Japan's economy became the third strongest in the world with all the attendant influence and implications this fact could imply. In short, North Korea saw its goal of national reunification put more and more in jeopardy as the forces in opposition grew steadily in strength.

## NOTES: CHAPTER 1

<sup>1</sup>Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (The RAND Corporation. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), pp. 45-46.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, pp. 38-46; see also Nikita S. Khrushchev's memoirs, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp. 367-71, in which Khrushchev states that it was Kim Il-sung's original suggestion to launch the attack on the South, a suggestion that Stalin did not oppose.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 42.

<sup>4</sup>"24th Anniversary of Korea's Fatherland Liberation War Commemorated," Peking Review, No. 26 (June 28, 1974), p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Kim Il-sung's report to the Fourth Party Congress. Nodong Sinmun, September 12, 1961, cited in Iipyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1975), p. 102.

<sup>6</sup>Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), p. 39.

<sup>7</sup>Selig S. Harrison, "One Korea?" Foreign Policy (Winter 1974-75), p. 38.

<sup>8</sup>Jane P. Shapiro, "Soviet Policy Towards North Korea and Korean Unification," Pacific Affairs (Fall 1975), p. 341.

<sup>9</sup>Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 90.

<sup>10</sup>Editorial in Nodong Sinmun, October 28, 1958, cited in Iipyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, op.cit., p. 97.

<sup>11</sup>Nodong Sinmun, November 23, 1957, cited in B.C. Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>12</sup>Choson chungang yon'gam, 1959 (Korean Central Year-book) (P'yongyang: Choson Chungang T'ongsinsa, 1959), p. 145, cited in ibid, p. 55.

<sup>13</sup>Iipyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, op. cit., p. 94.



<sup>14</sup>Glenn D. Paige, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, p. 43.

<sup>16</sup>Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 61.

<sup>17</sup>Glenn D. Paige, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, p. 45.

<sup>19</sup>Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), pp. 57-58.

<sup>20</sup>Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "GRIT at Panmunjom: Conflict and Cooperation in a Divided Korea," Asian Survey (June 1973), p. 540.

<sup>21</sup>B.C. Koh, "The Two Koreas," Current History (April 1970), p. 214.

<sup>22</sup>Fred W. Wellborn, Diplomatic History of the United States (Patterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1961), p. 372.

## CHAPTER 2

## The Years 1960-69

North Korea and Communist Bloc Politics

During the years from 1957 to 1959 the first cracks had appeared in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Chinese disagreement with the Soviet grand strategy of "peaceful coexistence," particularly after Mao discerned what he felt to be the growing ascendancy of power by the Communist nations over the imperialist camp was an important consideration. Soviet Leadership of the Communist world was becoming increasingly suspect in Chinese eyes following the failure of the Soviet Union to support China either in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis or in the border clash with India in 1959. As O. Edmund Clubb points out in his book Twentieth Century China:

It is necessary to view Mao Tse-tung's observation in the context of his military philosophy. It was his strong conviction that, if an army wins an advantage over its opponent, it should drive the advantage home.<sup>1</sup>

By not pursuing this policy Mao felt that the Soviet Union was abdicating its role as the vanguard of world Communism, and much worse, was even seen as striking a compromise with, or worst of all, in collusion with, the forces of imperialism. The promise by the Soviets in a secret agreement of October 1957 to assist China in developing nuclear weapons, with its subsequent repudiation in June 1959, was further "proof" to the Chinese that the Soviets could not be relied upon to

deliver. Further, it cast grave doubts regarding what sort of Soviet backing might actually be forthcoming if China and the U.S. should ever lock horns. Finally, it was seen as a Soviet attempt to force China to remain tightly locked both to Soviet policies and Soviet nuclear protection.

Just as the Chinese had jaundiced opinions of the Soviets, so too was the feeling mutual. Mao's attempt to propel China forward on the road to Communism brought forth attacks by the Soviets on the programs of the Great Leap Forward, in particular the commune movement. China's insistence on a more militant line, especially in dealing with the American "imperialists" who continued to support the Taiwan regime and block the reunification of China, was a continuing sore issue. Couched in ideological terms, the rhetorical repartee between the two countries served only as a mask for these deeper issues that reflected widely-divergent views of policy objectives and the means to achieve them.

The cracks that had appeared in the solidarity of the Communist world in the late 1950's quickly widened under the ideological bludgeoning that was to ensue. The year 1960 indicated how serious the rift in the Communist world had become with the beginning of open polemics between the two countries. In an article in the CCP theoretical journal Hung Chi (Red Flag) on April 16, 1960, entitled "Long Live Leninism!", the Chinese openly attacked the doctrinal espousals of the 20th CPSU of February 1956, advocating a return to active attack on imperialism.

Against this background, the neutral stance of North



Korea in the Communist world became more and more difficult to maintain as the dispute began to heat up. In trying to maintain neutrality, Nodong Sinmun, the Korean Workers' Party publication, merely reprinted this Red Flag article without editorial comment. Not only was Pyongyang attempting not to show favor in the rift, but it was also preoccupied at the time with events that had transpired in the South following the overthrow of the Syngman Rhee regime in April 1960. Fast-paced events in the Communist world, however, required close attention to the increasing number of pitfalls placed in the path of the non-principles in the dispute.

The Conference of Eighty-one Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in November 1960, was the watershed for the almost inevitable change in North Korea's stance. Although on the surface a semblance of unity existed in the Communist camp, in fact the conference had failed in its objective of attempting to repair the growing split. More, Pyongyang made it abundantly clear that it shared Peking's views. Imperialism must be met head on and destroyed. "To crush and paralyze imperialism is the only way to win peace" proclaimed a Nodong Sinmun editorial on December 7, 1960.<sup>2</sup> The undercurrents of North Korean dissatisfaction with the Soviet line had now become manifest and open for the world to see.

In spite of Kim's open backing of Peking, the Soviet

Union chose to publicly ignore the affront. Previous aid commitments were continued and additional ones were implemented, perhaps in the hope of swaying North Korea back toward the Soviets, or at minimum, assuring their return to the previous neutral position. If that was the objective, the effort was countered by China's continued, if limited, material assistance to Pyongyang despite her own tremendous economic difficulties in the wake of the failure of the Great Leap.<sup>3</sup>

Kim must have been somewhat chagrined at the need to insure his country's security by making his pilgrimage to Moscow in July 1961 to conclude the first of two very important military alliances shortly after the Park Chung Hee military group seized power on May 16th. The military pact signed between the two countries on July 6th was followed just five days later by the signing of an almost identical one in Peking. The pact with the Soviet Union had an expiration date in ten years, while the pact with the Chinese had no such stipulation. Both provided that an attack on North Korea by any power or coalition of powers would be considered as an attack on the other signatory. Both pacts carefully stressed this defensive aspect, clearly making plain to Kim that any aggressive action on his part most probably would go unsupported by the other principle.

Through the end of 1961 Kim was careful to walk the neutral line and in most particular not upset the fragile

status quo with Moscow. The new South Korean regime was still largely an unknown factor in regard to the actions they could be expected to take vis a vis the DPRK. Violently anti-Communist, the possibility could not be ruled out of an armed attack by the South to attempt a reunification of the nation. In any case, in the event of hostilities, Kim wanted to be as sure of his backing as it was possible to be. In fact, in his speech to the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in October, his reference to the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the international Communist movement was in direct opposition to the Chinese insistence that the CPSU should be referred to as "the leader" of the socialist camp and not as the "vanguard" of world Communism. Apparently Kim felt that this concession to the Soviets was both politically necessary and ideologically acceptable--particularly since it was expedient at the time. During the course of this CPSU congress the two major adversaries squared off and openly attacked the ideological position of the other, while Kim, supporting the Soviet position verbally, backed that of China (and North Korea) the following day by placing a wreath on Stalin's tomb, as Chou En-lai had done a few days earlier. In the Communist world, symbology would consistently seem to be a far stronger indication of reality than rhetoric, handshakes or smiles.

The growing crisis in the Communist world came to a head in the autumn of 1962. Almost simultaneously two major



international events took place that triggered the final break in the Communist bloc--the Sino-Indian border clash and the Cuban missile crisis. Growing North Korean feelings that the Soviets were capitulating to American military might were vindicated by Khrushchev's decision to back down in the face of American determination. Similarly, lukewarm Soviet backing of China when that country invaded disputed border territory in the areas of the North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh on October 20th ended altogether as Khrushchev reversed his stand after the Chinese had labeled his agreement to remove his missiles as "another Munich" and a betrayal of Castro. In Pyongyang this was seen as evidence of the decline in Soviet willingness to strongly assert her power and actively champion the cause of world Communism, even if it resulted in a nuclear showdown. As these two crisis periods came to a close North Korea was moving into strong alignment with Communist China.

Traditionally close relations between North Korea and China, the active Chinese participation in support of North Korea during the Korean War, great similarities in economic development policies, consistent Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism," "capitulationism" and collusion with the West, were all primary reasons for this shift in stance by Pyongyang. Perhaps Kim's greatest concern, however, and one frequently overlooked or underplayed, remained the matter of North Korea's own security. In the Soviet Union

under Khrushchev Kim apparently perceived that the strength of the international Communist movement, and its direction, had been sapped and misdirected. In the Chinese he felt there existed a similarity of views, characterized by the determination to meet imperialism head on, expressed in strongly-held beliefs that "To crush the aggressive maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists is the sacred duty of the world proletariat and all peace-loving peoples alike."<sup>4</sup> The Chinese, holding an identical philosophy, by now were seen to be not only as an ideological partner, but far more important, the greatest guarantor of her continued security in the face of the U.S. imperialist forces working in collusion with the "puppet regime" in the South.

In January 1963 an editorial appeared in Nodong Sinmun entitled "Let Us Defend the Unity of the Socialist Camp and Strengthen the Solidarity of the International Communist Movement." In this treatise North Korea left no doubt as to her leanings by making the first explicit defense of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) position during the Sino-Soviet dispute. For her backing of the Chinese in the Sino-Indian border clash and the Cuban missile crisis, and now this crystal-clear statement of support for the Chinese position, North Korea paid a heavy price both politically and economically. Continuously snubbed by the European Communist parties in late 1962, and in particular the East German Party congress in January 1963, North Korea, along

with Albania, was cut adrift from the remainder of the European Communist world. Further, and even more crucial, generous Soviet economic and military aid programs largely came to a halt.

Throughout the remainder of 1963 relations between North Korea and China continued to be more cordial while those with the Soviet Union grew more strained. Again symbology was an important indicator as articles concerned with the Soviet Union had all but disappeared from the pages of Nodong Sinmun. Delegations between Pyongyang and Peking must have strained the rail service due to their frequency between the two capitols. The communique issued after a high-level Korean delegation to Peking in June laid great emphasis on the close ties and similarity of policy outlook held by the two countries. In september the PRC returned the visit when a Chinese delegation led by Liu Shao-ch'i arrived and subsequently issued a communique that reinforced the principles of the one issued earlier in June.

1964 marked the high-water point in North Korean-Chinese relations. The January 27 Nodong Sinmun editorial, "Let Us Hold High the Revolutionary Banner of National Liberation" was a major indictment of the Soviet Union's "revisionist" policy and an open indication of the views held by the PRC and the DPRK. Probably the hardest slap directed against the Soviet Union during the entire campaign was the September 7th editorial in Nodong Sinmun, "Why Downgrade the Results



of the P'yongyang Economic Conference?" This editorial was a rebuttal to a Pravda article that had made disparaging remarks about an economic conference hosted by North Korea for thirty-four Third World nations in June. In the rebuttal the Nodong Sinmun editorial raised the rhetorical question whether the Soviet Union had given up the anti-imperialist struggle, and stressed the idea of the need for each country to be its own master (in previous years Pyongyang had often indicted the Soviets for meddling in the internal affairs of other Communist parties). The most significant portion of the editorial, however, was to minimize the importance of Soviet economic assistance to North Korea and assert, in fact, that the net effect had been harmful. The culmination was a major indictment that the Soviets had earlier engaged in direct exploitation of North Korea:

In the process of providing assistance in rebuilding factories, you have sold us facilities...and materials at prices far above those prevailing in the international market, while taking away from us in return many tons of gold, huge quantities of precious metals, and other raw materials at prices substantially below those prevailing in the international market.

When you talk about the aid you have given us, is it not reasonable that you also mention the above fact--that you took away from us the fruits of our painstaking labor at a time when our life was most difficult to bear?<sup>5</sup>

While pursuit of the North Korean independent line in the early 1960's as Kim moved the country into closer alignment with China had carried with it certain elements of satisfaction (a greater expression of independent action and a

limitation on external intervention in policy decisions, for example), it had also had disincentive effects. While the possibility exists that Kim might have gotten caught up in emotionalism in his attacks on the Soviet Union and in his support for the Chinese to some degree, it seems far more likely that his moves were carefully calculated to pursue the issue of independent determination of national policies and achieve the greatest degree of autonomy and freedom of action permitted by the nation's existence in the shadows of China and the Soviet Union. Kim's consistent advocacy of independent action provides much of the rationale for the ensuing rapprochement with the Soviet Union in late 1964 and early 1965 as a response to what must have been a growing realization that a course of action continuing along the same direction of close identification with China was patently disadvantageous in both the short and long term.

The ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 provided the occasion for a reconciliation with Moscow. Despite the degree of Kim's commitment to Peking, he had never allowed North Korea "to be totally and irretrievably aligned with the regime of Mao Tse-tung."<sup>6</sup> The cutoff of Soviet economic aid, technical assistance, and military arms had had a heavy adverse impact on the growth rate achieved by the Seven Year Plan (1961-67) as the North Koreans were forced to allocate large amounts of domestic resources for defense needs after the adoption of the "military line" in December 1962---brought on largely by the reaction to the loss of

Soviet prestige during this period and the perceived threat from south of the 38th Parallel. The Chinese, themselves heavily burdened by the economic depression resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward, were unable to provide the levels of material assistance required by the North Koreans.

Additional factors favoring reconciliation revolved around changes on the international scene, advantages that would accrue with Soviet support, and Kim's egotism. Internationally, Moscow's assistance to North Vietnam's "anti-imperialist struggle" must have been favorably received by the North Korean regime, while Chinese refusals to cooperate with the Soviets in aiding Hanoi took some of the steam out of the revolutionary fire that China espoused. Pyongyang also saw possibility of increased support by the Soviets for its reunification policy in the United Nations, a line of action that might further the North Korean cause by driving a wedge between South Korea and the world at large in an attempt to isolate her, and by continuing efforts to remove the United Nations presence from Korea. Finally, Kim, in the pursuit of an independent national line must have been annoyed by recurring outside suggestions that North Korea, in its ideological alliance with Peking, had become a Chinese satellite state.<sup>7</sup> Because of these factors, the move back toward accommodation with the Soviets seemed not only desirable, but necessary, and underscored "the



cardinal fact that P'yongyang's oscillating stance in the Moscow-Peking quarrel is primarily a function of its perceived self-interest."<sup>8</sup>

Accommodation took place as Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Pyongyang in February 1965. Following his visit relations between the two countries began to wax, while simultaneously those between Pyongyang and Peking were decidedly on the wane. In May the Soviets agreed to supply military assistance to the DPRK. In August, on the occasion of the celebration of the 20th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule, a high-level delegation to the DPRK led by Presidium of the CPSU (forerunner of the present-day Politburo) member Aleksandr N. Shelepin stood out in marked contrast to an undistinguished delegation from Peking. In July, a month earlier, a Nodong Sinmun article on the 27th explicitly criticized the Chinese language, stating that it reflected backwardness, a move hardly calculated to win friends.

While Pyongyang moved to settle its differences with Moscow, Kim also rationalized North Korea's mercuric alliance behavior and made his country's position very clear on August 12, 1966. In a Nodong Sinmun editorial, "Let Us Defend Our Independence" (often referred to as North Korea's "declaration of independence") very little was said that had not been put into print before; however, the timing of the editorial and the strong stress on the chuch'e principle

left no doubt of Kim's philosophy: "Communists cannot live ideologically shackled to anyone."<sup>9</sup> In other words, no Communist party should interfere in the internal affairs of any other and all must be free to pursue their own goals, within the context of the world Communist movement, according to the principle of chuch'e--national independence and self-determination. This obviously was designed to serve notice to both Peking and Moscow that "it is impermissible for a big party or the party of a socialist country to impose --abusing its position--its policy and put pressure on a small party...." Further, "a single center can never give unified guidance in the world revolutionary movement."<sup>10</sup> The editorial thus served notice that North Korea would brook no interference in its domestic affairs from Peking and Moscow.

The decline of the Sino-North Korean alliance may have resulted from a number of other factors related to, but not necessarily dependant upon, the North Korean decision to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union. There seems to be much validity to the assertion that events in Southeast Asia during the 1950's and 1960's (and later the 1970's) have served as a barometer for events in North Asia. The winding down of the Indochina conflict with the conclusion of the 1954 Indochina accords in Geneva corresponds to a period in which the DPRK actively sought to ease tensions in Korea as it introduced a plan to accomplish these ends at the conference in April-June. Pyongyang's plan called

not only for the withdrawal of all foreign troops (a situation complicated until the Chinese withdrew at the end of 1958), but for reductions in the armed forces of both North and South to 100,000 men or less within a year as well.

Now, in the early to mid-1960's, Kim was probably examining not only the actions of the U.S. "imperialists" in Southeast Asia, but also trying to discern their ultimate motives. The increasing American involvement in Laos during 1960 and 1961, and then the stepped-up American aid and participation in Vietnam were undoubtedly major factors that left doubt in his own mind regarding North Korea's security at a time when Soviet resolve was being shown to have questionable underpinnings. Looking to her south, North Korea must have had major questions regarding what the new Park Chung Hee group, backed by their American cohorts, might be planning. The escalation of American involvement and particularly the U.S. bombing in North Vietnam in late 1965 and early 1966 was viewed by the Chinese as a distinct threat, and most probably in the same light by the DPRK as well, particularly as it became obvious that Seoul stood to benefit greatly as a result of direct participation in Southeast Asia.<sup>11</sup> A difference of opinion arose between China and North Korea over how this threat should be met, and this difference led to Pyongyang increasingly siding with the Soviet position.

The difference revolved around the issue of taking



"united action" to oppose U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. China stood firm (for reasons that will be brought out) behind her position that united action could only be undertaken between herself and the Soviet Union after the settlement of ideological differences, while the proposal advanced by Japanese Communist Party (JCP) leader Miyamoto Kenji was basically the opposite view--that "united front" action should be undertaken immediately to come to the aid of the North Vietnamese regime and that ideological differences could be ironed out at a later time. As a result of this seeming Chinese intransigence, both the Japanese Communist leadership and North Korea, strongly supporting Miyamoto's line, turned away from China and her conditional support for North Vietnam; support to come after the settlement of outstanding ideological differences.

As alluded to, there were deeper issues at stake than simply ideological warfare involved here. Indeed the issues transcended the ideological polemics of Moscow and Peking and penetrated to the depth that Moscow was looking at the Chinese as a potentially grave threat to the Soviet Union, particularly after the first Chinese nuclear test two days after Khrushchev's ouster. The U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, initiated in February 1965, was a golden opportunity for the Soviets to try and undermine and split the Chinese leadership. Mao, just a month earlier in January, had publicly predicted that the U.S. would not become heavily involved in Vietnam. Now they were, and to take

advantage of the situation, Moscow pressed for more vigorous Soviet involvement in Vietnamese affairs.

As a result of these developments which had undermined Mao's aura of infallibility, an intense foreign policy debate took place in China as one faction, led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-ping, foresaw war with the United States and felt that an accommodation should be reached with the Soviet Union in order to reequip and modernize the army to meet the American challenge. Mao, supported by Lin Piao, foresaw no such involvement if the warfare was kept at the lower levels of the conflict spectrum. Thus Lin Piao's September 2, 1965 speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," was expression of this philosophy as Mao, backed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under Lin, eventually concluded the foreign policy debate in November<sup>12</sup> with a number of those opposing him dropping out of sight fairly immediately, while others such as Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-ping were purged later during the Cultural Revolution that was just getting underway at this time (and largely as a result of this debate). Signals to the U.S. that the Chinese did not wish direct involvement in the Vietnamese war were very carefully laid out first in October when Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi delineated on October 8, 1965 the sole criteria under which China would become militarily involved: "Should the U.S. invade China's mainland, [emphasis added] we will take all necessary measures to defeat them. By then, the war will have no boundaries."<sup>13</sup>

A further statement by Chou En-lai in the May 13, 1966 issue of Peking Review, "China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the U.S." removed any existing doubts that might have remained about Chinese intentions.

A second important factor in North Korea's move away from China was related to domestic events transpiring in the latter country--largely being generated out of this foreign policy debate. As the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) unfolded in its seeming helter-skelter fashion, North Korea found itself on the receiving end of broadsides from Red Guard publications. Beginning in January 1967, Chinese wall posters accused "fat" Kim Il-sung of slandering China, and sabotaging the Vietnamese struggle and accused him of being a "counterrevolutionary revisionist," and perhaps worst of all, a "millionaire, and aristocrat, and a leading bourgeois element in Korea." These exchanges may have been indications of the personal and ideological coolness between Mao and Kim, as the latter was not disposed to pay any attention to Mao's "thought" as he carefully constructed his own "personality cult."<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, they may have been return barbs for the support, of whatever nature, that Kim's pushing of the Soviet line may have aided Mao's enemies in the previous policy dispute that split the Chinese leadership. At any rate, such epithets could be fightin' words, and apparently were as clashes, involving reported exchanges of gunfire, took place



in 1968-69 near strategic Mount Paiktu in the Changpai Mountains region along the Manchurian border.<sup>15</sup> In late 1969, as China emerged from the tumult of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese-Korean relations turned drastically for the better, while concurrently, Pyongyang's relations with Moscow continued to develop on a satisfactory plane.

During the period 1966-68 the North Koreans had consistently sided with the Soviet Union in the ideological dispute. On the issue of whether ideological differences or solidarity of the socialist camp should take preference (as manifested by the "united front" dispute), Pyongyang, as already presented, went against the Chinese position and supported Moscow. Further, publication of the previously-referenced Nodong Sinmun editorial, "Let Us Defend Our Independence!" was an indirect criticism of alleged Chinese big-power chauvinism, and although designed to proclaim to both Peking and Moscow North Korea's independence, it served at the same time to announce Pyongyang's separation from the Chinese sphere of implied or real influence and control. Finally, North Korea's immediate and unqualified support of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was "notably inconsistent with its stand on autonomy in intra-bloc relations."<sup>16</sup> This imperative of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" was ideologically rationalized in terms of the need to counter rampant "revisionism" in that European bloc country.

For her efforts and support North Korea was rewarded by the Soviet Union. In February 1967 a high-level North Korean delegation arrived in Moscow in search of economic and military aid, and after two weeks of bargaining emerged with an apparently favorable agreement on March 2. While details of the agreement are lacking, a New York Times article of February 1, 1968 listed the nature and considerable extent of Soviet arms aid. Further, when the North Koreans captured the U.S.S. Pueblo, an American electronic surveillance ship off Wonson Bay in January 1968, the Russians expressed almost immediate support, while a lukewarm statement of support from the Chinese was four days in coming, and only after the war scare had abated. Finally, the Soviet Union stepped up the vigor with which it championed the North Korean cause at the United Nations by campaigning strenuously on Pyongyang's behalf before the General Assembly debates on the Korean question in 1967 and 1968 and as North Korea's guardian during the debates in the Security Council over the Pueblo affair.

While North Korea actively supported the Moscow line during this period and generally was at odds with the Chinese as they were domestically preoccupied with the internal disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, the primary motivation was Pyongyang's continuing search for independence of movement in the international arena. Again the importance of symbology. For the occasion of the

fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1967, that the North Korean delegation was led by Ch'oe Yong-gon, the titular head of state and number two man in the KWP hierarchy, and not Kim Il-sung personally, appeared to indicate North Korea's desire to stress its genuine independence.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, North Korea's insistence on direct negotiations with the United States to effect the release of the Pueblo's crew was indicative of its desire to be seen by the world as a truly independent, autonomous member of the world family of nations, a nation capable of not only dealing with the world's leading power, but one capable of bringing it to heel as well.

At the end of the 1960's North Korea had come full circle in the Communist world: from neutrality in the developing Sino-Soviet dispute of 1960; to strong alliance with China from 1962-64; to accommodation with Moscow leading to a stance which, although "independent," was considerably closer in line with Moscow's thinking than Peking's during the period 1965-69; to a neutralist stance once again as the PRC and the DPRK mended their fences in October 1969 and cemented the relationship when Chou En lai visited Pyongyang in April 1970.

The mercuric policy line of North Korea was indicative of Kim's perceptions of where advantages lay in the pursuit of the DPRK's self-interests and his concepts of how to exploit these advantages. Whether his policies were "right"



or "wrong," "successes" or "failures" are hard to empirically determine. That North Korea emerged from the period moderately unscathed would mitigate in favor of the proposition that they were somewhat successful in the short run. Whether her behavior may have been inimicable in the long run will be the subject of further examination here, and of course will have to be measured by what transpires in the future.

#### Economic and Military Strategies

The Three Year Plan (1953-56) of economic reconstruction and the Five Year Plan (1957-61, shortened to 1960) of economic development were major milestones for North Korean economic advancement and furtherance of growing independence from Soviet suzerainty over the economy. During the period of the Three Year Plan the industrial growth rate was estimated at 41.7%, while that of the Five Year Plan was 36.6%.<sup>18</sup> It seemed at the conclusion of the Five Year Plan in 1960, successfully completed a full year ahead of schedule, that giant strides were being made in achieving the establishment of a

...[P]yramidal industrial structure similar to that which had emerged in Japan in the course of that nation's spectacular economic development. At the national level, large-scale industrialization, primarily in the heavy industry sector, would continue at maximum speed and in highly concentrated form, underwritten by generous state investment. At the local level, the development of a myriad of small and medium industries would be encouraged, industries concentrating upon the production of consumer goods, dependent upon local resources and labor and requiring little or no capitalization.<sup>19</sup>

Like the Soviet model, the North Koreans maintained a tight centralization of basic planning for resource, manpower and capital allocation. The successes of the Five Year Plan had created an optimistic mood for further development and economic expansion, hardly the prevailing situation at hand in the China of 1960.

The new Seven Year Plan was launched in 1961 after an initial period of "readjustment" and "balancing actions." Major emphasis of the plan were placed on achievement of two primary goals: raising the living standards of the population, and expanding the industrial base by inducing a significant technological revolution. The plan was divided into two periods, 1961-63 and 1964-67. During the first period effort would be concentrated on state investment in light industry, agriculture and marine production to increase the peoples' livelihood. During the second four-year period, the stress would be placed on the heavy industrial effort.

The carefully mapped-out program received extensive modification in late 1962, however, because of the effects of external developments. The May 1961 coup in the South, the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict with the attendant mistrust of Russia's motivations and reliability as an ally eventually resulted in the adoption of the so-called "military line." At the Fifth Plenum of the KWP's Central Committee in December 1962 a foreign policy

dispute began to shape up within the leadership as disparate views on economic development strategy as it related to foreign policy implementation came into contention. The militant line had begun to become apparent a year earlier when Kim spoke to the KWP's Fourth Congress in September. At that time he described the horrible conditions in the South and exhorted the people of that state to carry on the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle. Now, in late 1962, there had erupted this strong debate between a predominantly military group who saw great danger of an attack by South Korea backed by the U.S. and who favored a close alliance with the Soviet Union in order to modernize and professionalize the North Korean army. A second group, with predominantly Party affiliations, opposed expansion of the defense forces and pressed for broad-based economic development. In broad external characteristics, the policy debate taking place in Pyongyang and the general makeup of the two groups was not unlike similar debates that took place in China in 1959 and again in 1965. In the North Korean case, Kim apparently adopted a neutral stance, managing and coordinating this debate--though explicitly rejecting proposals to back Moscow in the Sino-Soviet schism.<sup>20</sup> With the fall of Khrushchev, the intensification of the war in Vietnam (particularly as the U.S. bombing of the North impressed the North Koreans with their own vulnerability to such attack) and the involvement of U.S.-maintained ROK forces



in that conflict, Kim apparently, however, moved towards more of a compromise policy that increased the emphasis on defense--a move that had immediate impact on the conduct and structuring of the Seven Year Plan. From early 1963, as the plan was initially modified to meet the perceived threats emanating out of the events of 1962, but before the intensification in Vietnam, the phrase, "walking on two legs," now had the new connotation of equal emphasis on economic and military development; heretofore it had meant the development of industry simultaneously with agriculture.

The Seven Year Plan had originally called for an annual average increase in total industrial product of 18%; however, after growth rates of 14% in 1961, 17% in 1962, 20% in 1963 and 17% in 1964,<sup>21</sup> the economy slowed drastically as a serious setback occurred in the 1965-66 period. The strains of trying to maintain an unrealistically high sustained growth rate over such a long period undoubtedly was a major factor, particularly with the strains imposed by the large allocations into the defense sector. Additionally, harvests below the officially indicated figures, raw materials problems, shortage of fuels and electrical power, lagging coal production and the rupture with the Soviet Union cutting off the prime North Korean source for machinery, spare parts and technical assistance were additional causative factors. The problems were serious and precipitated a second intense internal political debate.

The debate within the North Korean leadership at the KWP's "Representatives' Conference" in October 1966 apparently revolved around the issue of reexamining current policies with an eye to reducing the target goals to more realistic levels. Those who advocated this line were soon labeled with charges of being "negativist," "conservative," and "revisionist." At the roots of the controversy can be perceived a close parallel with the Chinese leadership debate after the Great Leap, that of "at least implicit questioning of the Place Politics in Command thesis, with critics urging a greater reliance upon rational economic objectives."<sup>22</sup>

The ouster in March 1967 of more than a hundred leading moderates, coupled with "on-the-spot personal guidance" trips by Kim to mines and factories "provided an occasion for the working people throughout the country to shatter passiveness and conservatism, and effect a new upsurge."<sup>23</sup>

Also, at the October conference, the Seven Year Plan was extended by three years to 1970, in order to allow for a larger allocation of resources to the defense sector. It was also a tacit admission of an economy plagued by significant problems.

By early 1968 the economy had begun to move again towards recovery. Internal reorganization coupled with resumed Soviet economic aid were major factors. Soviet aid played a major part in the latter phase of the Seven Year Plan as the Russians assisted in the completion of fifty major enterprises<sup>24</sup> and supplied significant military aid.

As a result, Kim was able to boast of a growth rate of 17% in 1967 (after a rate of -3% in 1966). Additionally, the agricultural growth rate for the 1961-67 period showed an average growth of 3.5%.<sup>25</sup> The economy, in spite of slow-downs caused by economic dislocations, shortages, and labor and management problems, had made a respectable recovery and significant progress.

The growing strength of the North Korean economy was continuously being sapped by the pressing defense needs. At the Central Committee plenary session in December 1962 when the "military line" was adopted, the decision was made not only to strengthen the North Korean defensive capability, but more, placed the nation on a virtual war footing that eventually transformed the nation into a highly-integrated garrison state. While doing this Kim eyed the possibility of furthering a revolutionary struggle in South Korea similar to the one being waged in South Vietnam. With the U.S. becoming increasingly involved in that effort, the possibility of developing a second guerrilla front offered strong possibilities for bringing about a reunification of the nation. The developing economic strength of the South Korean nation seemed to make imperative an increase in the pace of Pyongyang's timetable for conquest of the South--the longer she waited the more difficult would be the ultimate conquest as North Korea's potential appeal diminished in contrast to a South Korea which, with massive



(relative to the amounts of aid Pyongyang was receiving from Moscow) U.S. aid, was outstripping the North's economy, an economy that was heavily burdened with high levels of defense spending.

The domestic cost of the continued military effort was exacting a heavy price in North Korea. Between 1967 and 1970 the DPRK spent an average of 20% of its budget on defense, one of the highest levels in proportion to population in the world.<sup>26</sup> In terms of GNP, the percentage spent for military purposes in 1968, as an example, was 17.4%, or at a rate roughly four times greater than the percentage expended by South Korea on defense<sup>27</sup> (from domestic sources). This tremendous slice of the national budget devoted to propagation of the military sector was no doubt a major factor in bringing about a shift in North Korean policy towards moderation in the 1969-70 time period,<sup>28</sup> particularly in view of the negligible results being achieved while engaged in the pursuit of this policy.

The meeting of the "Representatives' Conference" in October 1966, which it may be recalled had developed into a significant debate over economic issues, was originally held to create an operational plan for further military development in the North and the creation of a viable revolutionary effort in the South. Kim's desire, as always, was to expel "the American imperialist aggressors" from Korean soil, and likewise dispose of "their lackeys" in Seoul. To accomplish

these aims infiltration of the South and subversion efforts were drastically increased in number and ferocity. In 1967 the U.N. Command in Seoul reported a ten-fold increase over the previous year in significant incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in South Korea proper.<sup>29</sup> The culmination of this activity was the 31-man North Korean commando raid on Park Chung Hee's Presidential mansion (the Blue House) in a dramatic assassination attempt on January 21, 1968. Overshadowing this event (at least in American eyes) two days later was the North Korean capture of the Pueblo. On April 15, 1969, a year later, an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down in international waters off the North Korean coast, and in August a U.S. helicopter was shot down in the DMZ, although the crew was subsequently released.

North Korean bellicosity had reached a high point and was probably designed to accomplish a number of purposes.<sup>30</sup> First, the guerrilla actions in the South could inflict direct damage on the South and have disincentive effects on foreign investment. Second, structuring a constant climate of military threat coupled with nationalistic appeals, and emphasizing the sacrifices of those fighting for "freedom" in the South, provided a rationale for continued sacrifice for workers and peasants in the North. Third, an active and effective guerrilla campaign against the Park Chung Hee regime might well create a climate of

fear and political uncertainty that ultimately might undermine that regime. And fourth, continued violence in the South would insure that Park's government would realize that to undertake any further direct assistance in the Vietnam conflict by increasing troop levels in that theater above the nearly 50,000 already committed could only be undertaken by jeopardizing its own security at home. In this way Kim Il-sung was not only furthering his own objective of reunification, but was also providing direct support to Ho Chi Minh's cause by tying down South Korean troops at home that might otherwise be deployed to Southeast Asia if the United States chose to employ them. The advocacy of the "united front" policy, taken in this light, indicates not only initiation of direct assistance to the Vietnamese effort, but the indirect benefits that would accrue through the creation of a second front in Korea, an effort that would dilute U.S. strength and tie down South Korean forces at home. The bellicose line directed towards the United States, certainly keeping in line with North Korean hate for the American presence, decidedly was a gamble that the United States would not take drastic counter action, but perhaps less risky than otherwise might have been the case, given the massive U.S. involvement in Indochina, particularly in the 1968-69 period.

The actions of the North did, however, have serious counter-productive results. First, the stepped-up military activity against the South, highlighted by the commando



raid, the Pueblo, and EC-121 incidents in particular, increasingly gave the DPRK a reputation for reckless, irrational behavior that considerably hurt her capability to gain support abroad. This was to have considerable import during the 1970's as she sought support among the Third World nations and in her search for support in United Nations actions. Highly important, too, was Moscow's reaction to the downing of the EC-121. Soviet assistance to the U.S. in searching for survivors served to place notice before the North Koreans that the Soviet Union patently disapproved of the action.

Secondly, the efforts to disrupt the South's economy were obvious failures as the rate of growth continued to rapidly expand and foreign investment mushroomed. For example, the average annual growth rates of real GNP rose 8.4% in 1967, 1.31% in 1968 and 15.5% in 1969<sup>31</sup> as the economy boomed. The second Five Year Plan that began in 1967 showed an overall rate of growth of 12.7% for the years 1967-69.<sup>32</sup> Foreign investment during the period climbed rapidly as U.S. and Japanese investors in particular continued to provide financial inputs for capitalization. Between 1965 and 1970, for example, Japanese loans and grants had increased in amount from \$45.9 million in the former year to \$165.6 million in the latter, while by 1975 the figure would be well over the half-billion dollar mark.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, these actions of the North Koreans triggered an increased drive to modernize and strengthen the ROK forces.

Immediately after the Pueblo incident President Johnson pledged \$100 million in special military aid to South Korea and dispatched former Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to South Korea to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to defend Korea. Modernization of the Korean forces serving in Vietnam was but the first step of a modernization program of ROK forces that would begin in the early 1970's. The end result of the North Korean aggressive actions, then, served to further entrench the U.S. presence in South Korea and the American commitment, and also brought on reports in November 1970 that the U.S. had pledged \$750 million for a program to modernize South Korean forces, a move that would significantly increase their capabilities and strength relative to the North Korean forces.

The first indications of a shift in policy could be discerned at the end of 1968 and in early 1969. At this time approximately a dozen high-ranking military officials closely associated with the North's militant posturing were dismissed--virtually the whole top military command.<sup>34</sup> In a move to lower North Korea's dangerous warlike profile, revolutionaries in the South were served notice that henceforth they would be primarily on their own to foster the revolution in that region:

The oppressed and exploited masses can win freedom and emancipation only through their own revolutionary struggle. Therefore, the South Korean revolution must in all situations be made by the South Korean people on their own initiative.<sup>35</sup>

This November 1970 statement at the Fifth KWP Congress thus spelled out that the North would only be "obligated" to assist after the revolution had begun.

The concrete results in Pyongyang's changing policy was a sharp drop-off in subversive activity directed towards the South starting in 1969 and continuing in 1970 and 1971. Despite the North Korean policy shift, defense spending remained high through 1971 as it reached a height of roughly 30% of the budget,<sup>36</sup> and then dropped off thereafter to 17% in 1972.<sup>37</sup> It was with this shift from an extremely bellicose foreign policy approach to a more moderate line that the decade of the 1960's came to an end.

#### The Non-Communist Challenge

During the 1960's a new international relationship revolving around the Korean peninsula began to take form. The triangular relationship of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, as each interacted with its client states, began to undergo change as a resurgent Japan began to make itself felt with increasing weight throughout the course of the decade. The nature of that presence, the development of a four-power relationship with Korea as the focal-point and common juncture, has had great impact in Japan's developing relationship with South Korea, and in the nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship as well.

Against the background of a colonial past and talks initially begun in April 1952 to settle differences between



the two nations, South Korea and Japan finally achieved a normalization in relations as a treaty, agreements and related documents were signed on June 22, 1965. The successful conclusion of this Treaty of Basic Relations was made possible after the impasse between the strongly anti-Japanese Syngman Rhee regime was overthrown in April 1960 and eventually replaced after an interim period by the Park Chung Hee regime after the military "revolt of the colonels" in May 1961. Prior to the Japanese ratification of this treaty, Prime Minister Sato in a policy speech before the 50th Special Session of the Diet in October 1965 made the following points in regard to the Treaty: first, that the treaty between the two countries would form the basis of a new era of cooperation and prosperity; and second, that charges to the effect that this treaty would develop into a military alliance had no substance whatsoever, given the letter and spirit of the Japanese constitution.

The growing union between the Republic of Korea and Japan were to have many effects. First, and extremely important to North Korea, the Seoul-Tokyo axis developing in the wake of the 1965 normalization treaty was characterized by strong economic ties with far-reaching implications. Second, the bilateral American alliances in North Asia, characterized by the Security Treaty with Japan (ratified in 1960) and the Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea (ratified in 1954) were now augmented and strengthened as

a de facto alliance, albeit primarily economic in form, was now being forged to construct a third side in the relationship that heretofore had been but two relatively mutually exclusive pacts.

Growing Japanese investment in Korea, continuing despite the North's attempts to disrupt the South's economy and intimidate foreign investors, was becoming an instrumental factor in the rapid economic development in the South. This rapid economic progress had the effect of further exacerbating the economic dissimilarities between the two halves of the Korean peninsula and hence, the possibility of reunification. Ironically, it was during the very period that the DPRK was reaching the high point of its attempts to maximize its policy of self-reliance that the Southern regime was becoming more heavily dependent on Tokyo. Throughout the remainder of the decade, as Japan and South Korea drew closer together, North Korea had become markedly hostile to the Japanese government and more shrill in her denouncements of a perceived resurgence of Japanese militarism and economic neocolonialism in South Korea. The growing power of this Seoul-Tokyo pact was undoubtedly a common denominator of the revived Peking-Pyongyang friendship in late 1969 and early 1970, as evidenced by Kim Il-sung's statement to Chou En-lai in April 1970: "Should U.S. imperialism and Japanese imperialism...dare to launch a new adventuresome war of aggression

again, then the Korean people...together with the Chinese people [will] fight against the enemy to the end."<sup>38</sup> For both China and North Korea the specter of a rearmed Japan was a possibility that neither liked to contemplate either for historical reasons or for the possible threat such a vast economic power could potentially generate if coupled with expanded military capability--particularly the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally, as the Seoul-Tokyo link solidified, strong fears were apparent in both Communist capitals that South Korea was quickly being drawn into a Japanese sphere of influence. These fears received credibility with issuance of the Nixon-Sato Communique in November 1969 which proclaimed Korea to be "essential to Japan's own security."

The growing alignment of South Korea and Japan had beneficial aspects for the United States. Japan, which had been a vital rear base (and still was), had now become a vital factor in South Korea's growth development and security as well. With heavy infusions of aid and investment capital into South Korea, Japan was assuming the previous U.S. economic role in South Korea. Thus, as the North Koreans perceived the situation, the growing Japanese economic influence was a direct threat for two major reasons: the direct threat posed by an economically strong South Korea, and the growing possibility that in the long run the North's ability to effect a reunification would become increasingly



more difficult to engineer because of Japan's growing economic stakes in South Korea, a stake that would probably encourage the Japanese to try and influence events in order to maintain the status quo. As a result, "Japanese activities in Korea are thus an integral part of the problem,"<sup>39</sup> particularly the North Korean problem of how to achieve reunification.

Throughout the decade, as the North Koreans looked at the situation, it was the U.S. presence in the South and the support of the Southern regime that remained the greatest obstacle to a successful reunification effort. On the other hand, President Park had continuously fought to insure that the U.S. presence would not only remain, but remain undiminished. Thus, he had reacted strongly against any indications of a reduction the American commitment, and as Mr. Morton Abramowitz points out in Moving the Glacier, the improved military capability that allowed the ROK to commit 2 1/3 divisions to Vietnam starting in 1965 could at least partially be viewed as a substitution of Korean forces in that conflict in order to insure that the U.S. commitment in South Korea would remain a credible deterrent to any North Korean attempt to reunify the country by force.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, the Korean decision to send troops also resulted in modernization of these forces, battle experience, and significant economic benefits to the nation.

The increased bellicosity of the North Koreans, pointedly manifested during the Pueblo incident in 1968 and the downing

of the EC-121 a year later, were the high points of the anti-American efforts. Whether these incidents occurred as a result of North Korean policy, or as a result of the policy which has continuously inflamed hatred of the "American imperialists" since the Korean War, is still unclear. No matter whether either or both incidents were centrally-initiated or whether they were local, independent manifestations of anti-Americanism, the end result was the same: a U.S. presence which had been relatively static was suddenly and significantly strengthened, and a major plan to modernize ROK military forces was quickly forthcoming. For all the reasons discussed earlier, these anti-American lashes, probably born out of the frustration engendered by the U.S. design to prevent reunification of the Korean peninsula by direct action of the DPRK, seem to have had strong counterproductive effects, in the long run more than offsetting whatever limited gains had been achieved in the short run (e.g., an "ego trip" for Kim Il-sung, propaganda victories, a temporary strain of the U.S.-ROK relationship in the wake of the Pueblo incident and whatever intelligence gains that may have been realized in the capture of ship, equipment and documents).

At the end of the decade North Korea's goal of reunifying the Korean nation seemed more remote than ever. Efforts to subvert the South through infiltration and attempts to spark a guerrilla war had been extremely unsuccessful as South Korea followed a policy of defense

rather than retaliation. Strong internal security actively aided by a population that would not support the North's guerrilla movement spelled its disaster. More, the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan had resulted in the infusion of tremendous amounts of aid and investment capital for economic development. The growing economic integration of these two nations threatened to make even more remote the possibility of reunification as the South's economy surged well ahead of that of the North, and Japan's attendant investment would probably incline her to support the maintenance of a status quo situation. Finally, the U.S. presence had not been disposed of, and in fact since the events of 1968 and 1969, had been considerably strengthened. These events had also highlighted the condition of the ROK forces with the further disincentive effect of galvanizing American support for their modernization. Pyongyang's change to a more moderate policy line could scarcely achieve less positive result in the future.



## NOTES: CHAPTER 2

<sup>1</sup>O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 352-53.

<sup>2</sup>Nodong Sinmun, December 7, 1960, cited in Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), p. 60.

<sup>3</sup>For details of both Soviet and Chinese aid during this period see *ibid*, p. 60; also see Iipyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1975), p. 109.

<sup>4</sup>Nodong Sinmun, November 6, 1962, cited in Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>5</sup>Editorial in Nodong Sinmun, September 7, 1964, cited in *ibid*, p. 79.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid*, p. 82.

<sup>7</sup>B.C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey (April 1969), p. 267.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid*, p. 268.

<sup>9</sup>Editorial in Nodong Sinmun, August 12, 1966, cited in B.C. Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>10</sup>Editorial in Nodong Sinmun, August 12, 1966, cited in *ibid*, p. 96.

<sup>11</sup>The U.S. military assistance grants to South Korea related to the Vietnam action amounted to \$1,453,900,000 from Fiscal Year 1966 through 1971. See note 16 in Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), p. 60.

<sup>12</sup>Maury Lisann, "Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle," Problems of Communism (November-December 1969), pp. 32-35. This is an excellent analysis of the 1965 debate within the Chinese leadership hierarchy and presents an interesting insight into Soviet actions designed to intensify the debate and split the Chinese leadership.

<sup>13</sup>Peking Review, October 8, 1965, p. 19, cited in Robert R. Simmons, "China's Cautious Relations with North Korea and Indochina," Asian Survey (July 1971), p. 639.

<sup>14</sup>Harold C. Hinton, "Chinese Policy Toward Korea," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), p. 24.

<sup>15</sup>Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey (December 1975), p. 1031.

<sup>16</sup>B.C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident...", op. cit., p. 268.

<sup>17</sup>B.C. Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>18</sup>Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part II: The Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 1224-25.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, p. 1230.

<sup>20</sup>Iipyong J. Kim, "Changing Perspectives in North Korea: Approach to Economic Development," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), p. 52.

<sup>21</sup>Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., pp. 1257-58.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid, p. 1259.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, p. 1261.

<sup>24</sup>Charles B. McLane, "Korea in Russia's East Asian Policy," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>25</sup>Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., p. 1114.

<sup>26</sup>Selig S. Harrison, "One Korea?," Foreign Policy (Winter 1974-75), p. 42.

<sup>27</sup>Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "GRIT at Panmunjom: Conflict and Cooperation in a Divided Korea," Asian Survey (June 1973), p. 535.

<sup>28</sup>Selig S. Harrison, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>29</sup>B.C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident...", op. cit., p. 272.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid, p. 275.

<sup>31</sup>B.C. Koh, "The Two Koreas," Current History (April 1970), p. 53.

<sup>32</sup>Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., p. 1268.

<sup>33</sup>John K.C. Oh, "South Korea 1975: A Permanent Emergency," Asian Survey (January 1976), p. 77.

<sup>34</sup>Morton Abramowitz, "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers," Adelphi Papers. No. 80 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 2.

<sup>35</sup>Jane P. Shapiro, "Soviet Policy Towards North Korea and Korean Unification," Pacific Affairs (Fall 1975), p. 344.

<sup>36</sup>Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," op. cit., p. 64.

<sup>37</sup>Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "GRIT....," op. cit., p. 535.

<sup>38</sup>Robert Simmons, "North Korea: Silver Anniversary," Asian Survey (January 1971), p. 105.

<sup>39</sup>Morton Abramowitz, "Moving the Glacier....," op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid*, p. 7.



## CHAPTER 3

## The Years 1970-76

North Korea and Communist Bloc Politics

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's assessment of the world situation before the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 could well have been a characterization of the situation prevailing in the Far East in the first half decade of the 1970's. "The present international situation," he said, "is still characterized by great disorder under heaven, a disorder which is growing greater and greater."<sup>1</sup> During no other similar period of modern Asian history, perhaps, had such significant events taken place that stood to alter the international order in that part of the world.

Within the Communist world "great disorder" had prevailed as it appeared that China and the Soviet Union might in fact go to war in 1969. The reported Chinese-initiated armed incident that took place on the small island of Damansky (or, which the Chinese call Chen-pao) in the frozen Ussuri River on March 2, 1969 brought about a full-scale Soviet reprisal on March 15 in which hundreds of troops were reported killed or wounded.<sup>2</sup> Following these military actions Soviet spokesmen on a number of occasions alluded to the possible need to engage China with nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> By August the situation had deteriorated to the point where war seemed near at hand, at least to some outside observers. Whatever the motivations of either the Chinese or Russian

actions, the apparent certainty was that this period saw the most severe crisis of the Sino-Soviet schism, a rift that had not only split the Communist world, but now brought it to the brink of at least partial self-destruction.

The growing Soviet threat to China, personified in the growing strength of Russian military forces along the 9700-mile Chinese-Soviet border was made more real by the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, carried out under the subsequent label of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." These events were no doubt major factors influencing Mao's decision to bring the still-incomplete Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to a close in 1968 and begin the active process of seeking rapprochement with the United States as a tactical counter to the Soviet threat.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the emergence of a new crisis period in the Chinese leadership in late 1968 and early 1969, as Mao and Chou En-lai sought to effect this shift in Chinese foreign policy toward accommodation with the United States and were opposed by portions of the military establishment (personified by Lin Piao) and radical leaders like Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and her protoge Yao Wen-yuan, again brought China to a dangerous point as a divided domestic leadership faced an ominous external threat. If Mao and Chou precipitated the border clash of March 2, 1969 in a move to maintain political control and highlight the Soviet threat, as at least one analyst has maintained,<sup>5</sup> then the internal threat to their

continued leadership must have been viewed at least as grave as the external Soviet threat.

The late-1968 decision of Mao and Chou to pursue a policy aimed at reconciliation with the United States moved forward despite internal opposition. The Chinese in January 1970 announced their willingness to resume ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, after aborting them the previous February. In February 1970 the two sides met and a second session was scheduled to be held in May. After the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April it appears, however, that Lin Piao, never in agreement with Mao's decision to improve relations with the United States, was successful in persuading Mao to cancel this May meeting and make instead a series of conciliatory gestures toward the Soviets.<sup>6</sup> This move to block further attempts to reach accord with the United States was reversed following the Second Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in August 1970 as Maoist forces gained decisive advantage over Lin, and in December Mao apparently felt that his position was strong enough to be able to extend an invitation to President Nixon to visit China--an invitation that was formally presented the following July when Secretary of State Kissinger was in Peking. Concurrent with the changing outlook toward improving relations with the U.S. was a similar change in outlook toward Japan, a topic that will be discussed later.

For North Korea, the real possibility that the Chinese



and the Soviets might go to war in mid-1969 carried weighty implications. On-going clashes with the Chinese along the Korean-Manchurian border during the same period that the Chinese and Russians were similarly engaged could have been interpreted by the Chinese as active Korean support of, and possible collusion with, the Soviets--a definite threat to North Korean independence and a situation which could serve to deepen a split with the Chinese to a level not desired by either nation. Similarly, were the Chinese and Soviets to go to war, there was no reason to believe that such a conflict could necessarily be confined to their own respective territories. Conceivably, combat action could spill over into Korea, and with the current North Korean lineup with the Soviets, a long border with China and the possibility of warfare with that nation, a drastically serious situation could quickly develop. Involvement in an internecine Communist conflict would not only pit one Communist party against another in this ultimately decisive action, but could threaten North Korea in ultimate terms by threatening both her political and her economic independence should her developing economy and growing industrial base be damaged or destroyed in such a period of conflict. Finally, there was the continuing perceived threat from the South posed by the ROK and their U.S. allies. With both of North Korea's patrons engaged in a head-to-head butting contest, there was considerable doubt that one, or both, would be

either inclined or able to come to Pyongyang's aid should a situation develop that required outside backing or support. Apparently this lack of security was a major factor in the decision to abandon the "military line" of bellicose militant confrontation policies in favor of a more subtle moderate policy line in the 1969-70 period.

It was probably with considerable relief to both sides that a reconciliation between China and North Korea took place late in 1969. For the Chinese, continued conflict with the North Koreans along their common border was not only a dangerous distraction from the much more serious situation along the Sino-Soviet border, but was a continuing element of alienation as well; an alienation that could lead to a Soviet presence along this border also, particularly if open hostilities should break out. The termination of the border clashes in this area and the ensuing lessening of tensions between China and North Korea coincided with the border talks between the Chinese and the Russians that began in October 1969 as these two states sought to ameliorate the tense situation there. The visit of North Korean President Choe Yong-gon to Peking for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1969 was a signal of the breakthrough in the action of reconciliation, as the North Koreans reportedly won concessions on the disputed territory in the Paiktu-san region and negotiated a new

trade pact calling for annual transactions totaling \$120 million. It was a telling occasion to indicate that the troubled revolutionary period of the GPCR, during which the "respected and beloved" Comrade Kim Il-sung had been vilified by the slanderous accusations and characterization, for example, as a "fat revisionist," had been terminated and normal state-to-state relations reestablished.

Chou En-lai's visit to Pyongyang from April 5-7, 1970, his first to a foreign nation after the Cultural Revolution, marked the occasion of renewed warm relations between the two nations, with further new Chinese military and economic assistance commitments to North Korea. Chinese territorial claims were quietly dropped later in 1970,<sup>8</sup> quite probably as a result of this visit. The "re-neutralization" of North Korea not only removed the elements of conflict between the two nations, but also served as a counter to Soviet inroads in their grand attempt to form a cordon sanitaire around China in line with Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security proposal.

This proposal, first advanced in an Izvestiia article in May, was expounded briefly at the end of Brezhnev's speech on June 8, 1969 at the World Conference of Communist Parties held in Moscow, when Brezhnev simply noted that "we believe the course of events is also placing on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia." This Asian Collective Security proposal allegedly



was designed to counter Western imperialist forces (particularly the U.S. and potentially Japan); but, despite Soviet protestations to the contrary, it was viewed by the Chinese as a thinly-disguised Soviet attempt to isolate and surround China. In concept, as the Chinese looked at this proposal, there seemed to be little difference between Brezhnev's ideas of containing "Maoist hegemonism" and the earlier U.S. "containment" policy, "a [Soviet] bid to create an Asian united front against China."<sup>9</sup>

On the other side of the coin, as Moscow looked at the Asian situation, she saw the real possibility that a coalition of all the powers of real consequence in East Asia might be forming. With Peking steadily moving toward accommodation with Washington (largely as a result of the perceived Soviet threat), it seemed entirely possible that a united front of Asian nations, backed by Washington, might be fashioned and its actions directed against the Soviet Union. A union of the United States, China and Japan, with South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan linked to the United States, could present a formidable challenge to Soviet policy and objectives. Therefore, Soviet strategy in the Far East and South Asia would revolve "around the objective of forestalling the actual creation of such a group...or of breaking it up were it to materialize."<sup>10</sup>

A Chinese response to the Soviet effort to forge a "united front" collective security system has been personified in the phrase "big-nation hegemony" which appeared in

a People's Daily editorial on January 23, 1971. Hegemony, according to Chinese usage, "'means expansion of power politically and economically, and exercise of control.'"<sup>21</sup> One of the basic tenets of Chinese foreign policy has been to reject this concept of hegemonic intent, both by disclaiming it as a Chinese objective, and by seeking its rejection by other powers, third countries, or groups of nations. The Shanghai Communique of February 1972 was the first instance of its acceptance as the U.S. and PRC stated that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony."<sup>12</sup> Continuing Chinese efforts to win acceptance of this principle, particularly in the negotiations with Japan to conclude a peace treaty, evidence the importance the Chinese have attached to this political maneuver as a counter to Soviet incursions in the Far East which are designed to foster the collective security concept.

Since the Chinese perceived this Asian Collective Security proposal as primarily directed against them, and have subsequently refused to support it for both practical and ideological reasons, other Asian Communist nations holding to a neutral line (in particular North Korea and North Vietnam) were thus forced into a noncommittal stance vis-a-vis the proposal. The USSR, to avoid creating a situation that would force these neutralist Communist parties to take sides, carefully refrained from extending explicit invitations or

requesting public endorsements from North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia, while these nations in turn studiously remained mute on the entire issue.<sup>13</sup> This Moscow decision not to push the neutral parties into a show of loyalty seems to have been justified on the basis that full-fledged defense treaties or military assistance pacts already existed and that inclusion of these nations could not only be counterproductive by possibly pushing them into closer alignment with Peking, but would also serve to dilute Moscow's power, influence and singular control over a developing collective security system if that system were formed along traditional collective pact lines wherein each member would have veto power over collective response.<sup>14</sup> In short, Moscow viewed the current alliance arrangements with these nations to be sufficient "proof" of their support with no real desire to put them into a position that might disprove this supposition. Thus, the USSR was tacitly currying the support of these nations, or at least going out of its way to keep from pushing them in any undesired political direction.

The reestablishment of North Korea along the middle road between China and the USSR was a situation that neither probably liked, but which was mutually viewed as preferable to North Korea allying with the other. As the Soviets did not push the Pyongyang regime to support its Asian Collective Security proposal, neither did the Chinese (on the surface



at least) seek to have Pyongyang actively support Chinese moves and actions directed against the Soviet Union. The tone of the Chinese line was strongly anti-Japanese as Chou, while visiting Pyongyang in April 1970, emphasized to Kim the growing Japanese role in South Korea, albeit still predominantly economic, and capitalized on the implications of the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communique, predicting the rise of Japanese militarism and another attempt to form a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chou's strong denunciations of the Japanese, no doubt designed to take advantage of a scheduled trip by Soviet President Podgorny to Japan, and Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese statements (quoted earlier in part) were but precursors of even stronger anti-Japanese and anti-American statements in June 1970 in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, an occasion that coincided with the current crisis as U.S. troops moved into Cambodia, and the second renewal of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty.

The announcement in July 1971 that the Chinese had extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China the following spring foreshadowed a significant change in the political milieu of North Korea and its strategic calculations. The development of a Sino-American detente, paralleling in many respects a similar growing Soviet-American detente, was certain to have created doubts in

Pyongyang regarding China's resolve to continue to challenge the imperialist camp in the continuing war of ideologies between East and West. More, it was a direct threat to her security, and was seen as a telling blow against the DPRK's efforts to achieve reunification of the Korean peninsula. Evidently to allay these fears, the Chinese went to great lengths to reassure Kim Il-sung that the accommodation with the United States would not endanger North Korea either directly or indirectly.

In actions expressing direct support for North Korea, China actively made explicit its backing for Pyongyang. In July 1971 both countries celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Korean alliance. In an interview on August 5 with U.S. newspaperman James Reston, Chou En-lai made a number of strong statements concerning possible Japanese expansion into Korea and the implications of such expansion.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps most significant, the two nations entered into an agreement signed on September 6 for Chinese military aid to the DPRK, the first such agreement for some fifteen years.

The 1971 anniversary celebration marking China's entry into the Korean War on October 25 was considerably more subdued than the June 25 celebration commemorating the start of that war, however, symbolically indicating the prime importance attached to the improvement of relations with the United States. Additionally, the crucial vote on the Albanian resolution the same day (probably not a coincidence)

over the issue of the PRC's admittance into the United Nations was a further factor calling for restraint. Following the PRC's admission to the U.N., Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, in his November 15 speech to the General Assembly, supported Pyongyang's demand that all United Nations resolutions on Korea be annulled and that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) be dissolved. In the Shanghai Communique of February 1972 between the United States and the People's Republic of China, this latter demand was again reiterated along with Peking's expression of continued support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. Thus, while Peking still continued to champion the North Korean cause, it was now being undertaken in a manner calculated to be less abrasive to the United States and executed increasingly through international diplomatic channels.

The announcement in July 1971 of the impending presidential trip to China elicited no immediate response from Pyongyang as the North Korean leadership apparently studied the circumstances and weighed the available options. By August, however, statements such as the one on the 6th by Kim Il-sung that characterized President Nixon's forthcoming trip as "a trip of defeat, not the march of a victor,"<sup>16</sup> indicated a policy of support for the Chinese actions, which was reciprocated by the Chinese actions described above. A statement by Professor Robert A. Scalapino on May 4, 1972



before a House subcommittee expressed his belief that "China and North Korea seem to have coordinated their policies closely."<sup>17</sup> This belief is strongly backed by an apparent ideological justification of the Sino-American accommodation in a Red Flag article of August 2, 1971 in which a study of Mao's 1940 essay, "On Policy," stressed the tactical use of temporary alliances as China distinguished between principal and secondary enemies in order to "pull together and manipulate all conflicts, gaps, contradictions in the enemy camps, and use them against today's principal enemy"<sup>18</sup>e.g., the Soviet Union. In this way, it appeared that the Chinese were taking great pains to reassure publicly North Korea of its support and the continued long-term ideological compatibility.

Chinese supportive actions for North Korea through the remainder of 1971 and the affirmation of support for the reunification of Korea embodied within the Shanghai Communiqué of February 27 apparently resulted in a situation in which "Peking emerged as the sponsor of Pyongyang, replacing Moscow...."<sup>19</sup> From this period North Korea, while trying to remain strictly neutral in its stance between China and the Soviet Union, has rated the PRC as "first among equals." The relationship continued to Progress and by 1973

All available signs indicated that North Korea's closest friend and ally continued to be the PRC. Messages Pyongyang exchanged with Peking on various occasions were invariably couched in the warmest possible language. What is more, both sides explicitly

recognized the supremacy of each other's "Great Leader" in their respective bailiwicks. Even editorials in Jen-min Jih-pao on North Korea contained at least one direct quotation from Kim Il-song, with Nodong Sinmun reciprocating the favor by quoting from Mao Tse-tung.<sup>20</sup>

Tensions between Moscow and Peking abated somewhat from the high-strung levels of mid-1969 through the early 1970's as the threat of large-scale military actions along the common border diminished despite the continued massive military build-ups along both sides. The massing of Soviet forces along the border, estimated at one million men,<sup>21</sup> and the Chinese reaction to it as they began to bolster their own security position in 1971 and 1972 by making large troop dispositions to the north, continued unabated, however. Conclusion of U.S.-China talks between President Nixon and Chou En-lai and the issuing of the Shanghai Communique directly benefited the Chinese by lessening the tensions along the Fukien sea frontier across the straits from Taiwan, thus allowing them to withdraw troops from this area and send them to the Chinese "Russian front." Finally, deployment in 1972 of Chinese nuclear weapons capable of strikes into the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of a situation in which any extensive armed conflict could conceivably escalate into a nuclear exchange. As a result, "the Chinese have been able to strengthen their defense and deterrent posture to the extent that they believe that the Soviet Union would be very ill-advised to launch any direct military attack...."<sup>22</sup>

Late in 1971, however, conflict between the two nations took place in surrogate form as the Indo-Pakistan War broke out. In August the Soviets had concluded the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty amid rising tensions between India and Pakistan over events in East Bengal. In December the decisive Indian victory over U.S.-backed and PRC-backed Pakistan pointed out the value of Soviet military aid and diplomatic support to the nations of Asia--an obvious display of the advantages accruing to any nation that might choose to join the Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security system to gain Soviet backing. The lesson regarding the possible fate of any nation enjoying only ambivalent U.S. support (and for that matter, any nation receiving similar support from any patron state) was certainly not lost on either North or South Korea. Likewise, the implicit lessons involved with this demonstration of Soviet backing undoubtedly served to reinforce Pyongyang's determination to not be seen as too closely aligned with China. This was a course of action that had proven costly in the past and would not likely be repeated in the future.

The continued cordial relations between Pyongyang and Peking may have been a little too cozy for Moscow's tastes, however, and in 1973 and 1974 several subtle reminders of North Korea's eternally delicate position were forthcoming. In response to several South Korean feelers for improved Soviet-ROK relations, the Soviets invited several South



Korean athletes to participate in the World University Games held in Moscow in August 1973. North Korean reaction to this event was predictable, as they denounced Seoul's "sinister political intrigues," taking care not to publicly criticize Moscow, and also refusing to send a sports team of their own as a protest. In November the South Korean ambassador to the U.S. met with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to discuss the Korean question. In July 1974 South Korea reported that non-governmental contacts had been made with the Soviets and that there existed a strong possibility that Soviet-South Korean trade would be initiated. A month later the ROK press service announced a decision that, starting in September, it would begin service with all non-hostile Communist countries, including the USSR and China.

By choosing to engage in these seemingly small and outwardly insignificant activities that carried large political implications, the Soviets probably were seeking to make a point to North Korea. Stripped of its trappings, the point being made was that the Soviet Union at will could deign to shift or diminish its support through the use of a wide variety of tactics, should North Korea be seen as straying too far from the middle road or pursuing policies perceived by the Soviets as detrimental to their policy objectives. In these instances, by choosing to deal directly with the South Koreans, the Soviets were bestowing

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at least tacit approval on South Korean President Park Chung Hee's June 23, 1973 statement that he would "not oppose the simultaneous admission" of North and South Korea into the United Nations (as the two Germanies had done at the United Nations 28 General Assembly session), a proposal that Kim Il-sung immediately condemned "as a 'vicious trick' of the U.S. designed to divide and rule Korea and perpetuate the division."<sup>23</sup>

Thus, Soviet overtures to South Korea play on the DPRK's fears that Moscow might go so far as to recognize South Korea, a fear that received considerable reinforcement after U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Habib proposed in November 1974 that the great powers cross-recognize the two Koreas. To counter such moves Pyongyang adopted the line that the South Korean regime was not an independent state, but only a U.S. puppet regime, and that the only "independent" Korean state is North Korea. North Korea, therefore, is strongly opposed to any initiative that hints of a "two Koreas" policy since acceptance of that concept would be a virtual repudiation of Pyongyang's claim that the North alone represents the Korean people as a whole. The Soviet actions in the 1972-74 period, whether originally designed for this effect, or whether the outcome of a different set of motives (genuinely encouraging a North-South dialogue aimed at reunification, for instance), drove home the point, however, that political support for North Korea was only forthcoming so long as the DPRK



followed a policy line that did not waiver too far from the independent neutral stance in favor of an accommodation with Peking that was too close, or a policy line that clashed with Soviet interests and objectives.

In many respects North Korea has seen its available policy options shrink in number during the course of the 1970's. The detente between the U.S. and the USSR, the reconciliation between China and the United States, accompanied by significant changes in Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations has had great impact on the situation. The Chinese "Dual Adversary" concept that had evolved in 1966, elevating the Soviet Union to the same plane as the United States as an enemy of China, had given way to recognition of the Soviet Union as the principal danger to the Chinese state in the near-term. As a result, China found "it necessary and expedient to align with her secondary enemy--the U.S.--against the principal enemy [the Soviet Union]." <sup>24</sup> This Chinese "compromise"/"collusion" with the U.S. (depending on the ideological outlook) placed North Korea in the position of either railing against both of her patrons, who, independent of one another, were pursuing similar policy lines of detente for similar objectives, or accepting the situation and working within the increasingly constrictive framework in pursuit of independent national goals.

One of the restrictive conditions laid down by these patron states was spelled out by the continued stress on the

need for "peaceful" reunification. The North Koreans could readily ascertain that Soviet and Chinese designs to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo carried far more weight for the immediate future than any thought of helping North Korea reunify the peninsula. As a result, recent Soviet support for North Korean reunification aims have primarily revolved around strong support of the North-South dialogue following the announcement of the July 4, 1972 joint communique. Similarly, Chinese statements have consistently stressed this "peaceful reunification" theme as they, too, have made it quite clear to Kim Il-sung that North Korean aggressive action to effect a reunification of the country is a definite no-no. On this one point, if nowhere else, Moscow and Peking both seem to agree.

While working within the stringent guidelines laid down by Russia and China, the DPRK has embarked upon a course of action that has been designed to improve its image around the world, particularly within the gathering of the Third World nations of which they profess to be a part, while at the same time carrying on a complementary policy line that seeks to isolate South Korea and diminish that nation's status and role within the international community. Maintenance of a moderate policy line during the early 1970's toward South Korea improved the DPRK's image abroad (although significant elements of distrust have continued to persist), and resulted in a widely expanded exchange of

diplomatic missions and increased diplomatic recognition. In May 1973 the DPRK was admitted into the World Health Organization; in July to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development; in May 1974 to the Universal Postal Union; in October to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and four months earlier in July, was given permanent observer offices at the U.N. and a permanent mission in Geneva. The international status of the DPRK, a nation just emerging from its isolation onto the world scene in the early 1970's was making rapid diplomatic progress.

In April 1975 international events transpired that threatened to jeopardize the stability of the North Asian region. The fall of Phnom Penh on April 17 was followed almost immediately by the fall of Saigon on April 30. The ensuing complete American withdrawal from Vietnam had enormous implications. The Nixon Doctrine, which had implied a trend "not toward isolation but toward 'distantiation,'" <sup>25</sup> had now, in the case of Indochina, been put to the test and found to be severely wanting. The immediate question beyond the debacle in Southeast Asia was that of the implications for other U.S.-backed nations, with particular attention to North Asia and immediate focus on the Korean peninsula.

Events on the peninsula had not charted a hopeful course since the North-South Red Cross and Coordinating Commission



talks reached an impasse in 1973, producing no further tangible results. By late summer the North refused to attend meetings of the North-South Coordinating Commission (NSCC) so long as the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Lee Hu-rak remained the leader of the ROK delegation. Lee allegedly was responsible for the abduction of the South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from Japan, and therefore charged by the DPRK as unfit to negotiate. In March 1974 a ROK ship had been captured by the North Koreans on charges of spying, and in retaliation, the Southern authorities had conducted a number of raids designed to arrest members of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, subsequently executing eight individuals accused of being members. In August, an assassination attempt on President Park failed; however, his wife was killed in the attempt and North Korea was charged for its alleged complicity. In November, an infiltration tunnel built by the North leading into the Southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone was uncovered. On February 15 and 26, 1975 two incidents took place at sea involving ROK and North Korean naval units. The increasingly acrimonious nature of the accusations and counter-accusations was steadily building a renewed air of tension on the Korean peninsula.

Against this backdrop the arrival of Kim Il-sung in Peking on the day following the fall of Phnom Penh had

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ominous overtones. The tone of the situation rapidly became decidedly worse as Kim, in a banquet speech on the day of his arrival said:

If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people.

If the enemy ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely answer it with war and completely destroy the aggressors.

In this war we will only lose the military demarcation line and will gain the country's reunification.<sup>26</sup>

The highly militant nature of the speech, taken in the context of the current situation in Southeast Asia as Cambodia collapsed and the war in Vietnam was in its final throes, seemed to portend the possibility of hostilities in Korea. Discerning the motivation behind the trip's timing (Kim's first visit to China in fourteen years) and the objectives it was designed to achieve was viewed in many of the world's capitols as a matter of extreme importance. Analysis of the ten-member delegation showed that, besides Kim, three were top military leaders, increasing speculation of military motives.

The joint communique released at the end of the nine-day visit on April 26 declared that both sides had reached "completely identical views" on all items discussed.<sup>27</sup> Peking voiced strong support for the DPRK's proposals for Korean reunification, while at the same time stressing the need for "independent and peaceful reunification." Further,



the ritual obligation to call for the dissolution of the U.N. Command and the withdrawal of all American troops was met. Finally, and very significant, Peking recognized the DPRK as "the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation," an explicit statement that China would oppose any effort to create "two Koreas," and was willing to give complete political and diplomatic backing to Kim's efforts to enhance his nation's prestige internationally toward the end of fomenting instability of South Korea.<sup>28</sup>

The next months were tense ones on the Korean peninsula as conflicting reports came into play. Reports that the North Koreans had moved elements of two armored divisions into position close to the DMZ<sup>29</sup> were countered two weeks later in a June 7 report from Seoul in which American military officials were quoted as saying that no apparent major redeployment of North Korean forces had taken place.<sup>30</sup> To forestall any possible North Korean aggressive intentions, the U.S. response to the capture of the container-ship S.S. Mayaguez in mid-May 1975 was patently designed to provide a warning to North Korea, and assurances to South Korea (and Japan), that American defense commitments would be met. These assurances came in the form of several statements by President Ford reaffirming U.S. support for South Korea, and by Secretary of State Kissinger in a major policy speech before the Japan Society in New York on June 18 when he stated that "'we will permit no question to

arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments' to Japan and other Asian allies."<sup>31</sup> In addition, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's first public admission that the United States had tactical nuclear weapons in Korea<sup>32</sup> was an obvious move calculated to be a direct warning to Kim Il-sung. In early September, Mr. Schlesinger again reaffirmed the U.S. commitment when he stated that U.S. forces in Korea would use "massive conventional firepower" against any North Korean attack.<sup>33</sup>

The American message to Kim undoubtedly was as clear as those he was receiving from both Peking and Moscow. In the joint communique issued at the end of Kim's trip to Peking, the expression "peaceful reunification" had been used no less than three times by the Chinese, and the tone was significantly less inflammatory than Kim's initial speech. Peking's policy of restraint on possible North Korean aggressive actions was not directly stated, but public statements and comments by Chinese diplomats and officials to third parties and in conversations with American officials indicated that such restraining action had been taken.<sup>34</sup> By late summer the situation on the Korean peninsula had eased as it seemed less likely that hostilities would in fact break out. The solid U.S. reassurances that America would live up to its treaty commitments, and the Chinese and Soviet restraining influences apparently were sufficient to deter Kim from any military

moves against the South, if that ever was his true intention at all.

North Korean relations with Moscow during the spring, summer and early fall of 1975 appeared to be somewhat cool. Kim Il-sung's apparent rebuff in his attempt to visit Moscow after his trip to Peking in April may have come from among a number of reasons:

- 1) The Soviets used the refusal to indicate their displeasure with Kim's decision to visit China first, giving the appearance of closer North Korean solidarity with China than with the Soviet Union. This is suggested despite the fact that the Soviet Union noted with approval and satisfaction the absence of anti-Soviet statements in the Peking joint communique [i.e., no "hegemony clause" was included].
- 2) Soviet concern about U.S. sensitivities following the developments in Indochina. Kim's visit to Peking was indeed disquieting in Washington and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid any close identification with the presumed militant stance of Kim to protect U.S. sensitivities in this regard.
- 3) The Soviet Union wanted to avoid the embarrassing predicament of either demonstrating full support for North Korea or alienating North Korea by being reluctant to support it with the same degree of enthusiasm as was shown by the Chinese.
- 4) Secretary General Brezhnev's illness or his busy schedule [the official reason given by Moscow for putting off Kim's visit].<sup>35</sup>

Whatever the true reason for Kim's failure to get to Moscow, the virtual Soviet refusal to see him at that time was a clear indication that any North Korea military action against the South would almost definitely not have Russian support.



Appearances seem to indicate that the Soviet position vis-a-vis North Korea is subtly different than that pursued by the Chinese. The positive Chinese approach toward alliance with the DPRK in recent years and apparent wholehearted support for major North Korean policies, exemplified in a possible hardening of the line taken against the U.S. military presence in South Korea from 1974 onward<sup>36</sup> and the Chinese announcement in the joint PRC-DPRK communique of April 1975 rejecting any "two Koreas" approach, contrasts in form with the policy of the Soviets. Soviet policy toward North Korea appears to be more reactive in form, tending to be designed to counter Chinese influence and to offset Chinese moves. Soviet policy seems to be characterized by an approach less positive toward bilateral relations with North Korea and in furthering North Korean objectives, than in pursuing strictly Soviet priorities in regard to the United States, China, and Japan.

To be sure, the Soviet Union continues to voice and render support for Pyongyang's policies as evidenced by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 1975. In that speech he affirmed that

Those goals [stabilization of the situation and speeding up the "peaceful reunification" of the Korean peninsula] would be served by the cessation of outside interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people and, in the first place, by the withdrawal from South Korea of all foreign troops stationed there under the U.N. flag, as well as by the conclusion of a peace treaty.<sup>37</sup>

The tone of the speech, while supportive, lacks real feeling and fails to convey the impression of more than surface commitment. Soviet interests in North Korea still largely seem to revolve around a counter to Chinese moves to curry favor and support from the DPRK, and to avoid being drawn into a situation wherein, because of alliance obligations under the 1961 treaty, the USSR would be compelled to actively assist in North Korea's defense in the event of hostilities. For this one reason, if none other, the Soviet Union will in all probability continue to counsel a policy of moderation to the DPRK.

Additionally, the Soviet relationship with North Korea must be viewed in the light that the DPRK is but a relatively minor element in the USSR's global calculations and strategy. To the PRC, however, the DPRK represents an entity with common historical, cultural, and developmental bonds, a nation that shares a long mutual border immediately adjacent to China's industrial heartland--conditions that mitigate in favor of closer bonds for practical, if not ideological reasons. Similar quasi-emotional ties with the Soviet Union would seem to be primarily limited to whatever degree of affinity is felt by the current Pyongyang leadership in appreciation for the support that initially established them in power. Beyond that intangible, the current Moscow-Pyongyang relationship evidences a cool, practical approach with underlying ties that are predominantly military and economic in nature--and always governed by a profound appreciation of the existing political realities.

As the year 1975 unfolded, big-power rivalry in the Communist bloc between the Soviet Union and China continued unabated, if at a somewhat lower key. The military takeover of Angola by a Soviet and Cuban-backed faction over U.S. and Chinese-backed opposition, like the Indo-Pakistani conflict in late 1971, signalled to the Chinese (and to the Americans) continuing Soviet moves to spread their sphere of influence in ever-widening circles. The rapid Russian arms build-up and the resultant world-wide expansion of Soviet capabilities has been viewed with apparent great concern by the Chinese. When Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Peking in October 1975 he no sooner got off the airplane before Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua immediately launched into a lecture warning the Secretary of the dangers inherent in detente with the Soviet Union, a move which may have also been designed to subtly express Chinese displeasure over the removal of Mr. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, an open critic of the U.S.-Soviet detente who frequently disagreed with the Secretary of State over these very issues. When President Ford arrived in Peking in December, he too was greeted with the same message as Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing reiterated what had been said to Dr. Kissinger. Teng bluntly warned:

Today it is the country which most zealously preaches peace that is the most dangerous source of war. Rhetoric about "detente" cannot cover up the stark reality of the growing danger of war.<sup>38</sup>



The Chinese viewed the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) as a tacit U.S. acceptance of a growing Soviet strategic military superiority and the Helsinki Agreement as a form of "capitulationism" to Soviet blandishments, reinforcing the view that Europe is the central point of superpower rivalry, a rivalry that eventually will lead to world war. "Certainly Peking's denigration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations," writes Dr. Allen S. Whiting, "and its attack on the Helsinki conference corresponded to China's basic security concern, namely the steady expansion of Soviet power at the expense of the United States strategic superiority."<sup>39</sup> Since Europe is held to be the focal point of superpower contention and China views the situation there as one characterized by increasing Soviet strength and decreasing Western allied strength, China has come out in favor of American military preparedness, and for a strengthened NATO alliance to counter growing Soviet strength--a move which would concurrently serve to take some of the pressure off China by ensuring a division of Soviet forces.

For its part, North Korea has pursued policies designed to enhance its international status while simultaneously working to undermine the ROK position and force the dissolution of the United Nations Command, and ultimately, the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. During the course of his May 22-June 9, 1975 trip to Rumania, Algeria, Mauritania,

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Kim Il-sung actively sought support for his reunification policies while consolidating and solidifying his relationship with Third World and socialist nations to facilitate the DPRK's bid to join the non-aligned nations movement and improve its position in upcoming United Nations actions.

In August 1975 North Korea scored a diplomatic victory when it achieved entrance into the Foreign Ministers' Conference of the Non-aligned Nations in Lima, Peru, while the application for membership of South Korea was rejected. This conference adopted a resolution on August 30 which contained a demand that all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the U.N. Command be withdrawn and the existing military armistice agreement be replaced with a peace agreement. On November 18, a pro-North Korean resolution, backed by the PRC and the USSR and dealing with the dissolution of the U.N. Command and a peace agreement to replace the existing armistice, was passed in the General Assembly while a diametrically opposed one was also adopted, with both sides claiming victory while in reality both resolutions had the effect of canceling the other.

1976 to date was not a particularly auspicious year for North Korean foreign policy. The most significant and inflammatory event was the August 18 killing of two American officers in a tree-trimming operation in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the truce village of Panmunjom. The incident,

coinciding with the Non-Aligned Nation Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, immediately brought forth a determined U.S. diplomatic and military response (not unlike that of the 1975 Mayaguez incident) which resulted in Kim Il-sung expressing "regret" over the incident, a statement that was described as "an unprecedented act of appeasement of the detested imperialists...."<sup>40</sup> The motives for the action are still unclear; however, if it had been purposely staged to highlight the continuing American presence in Korea, the incident quickly wiped out any propaganda advantages that the North Korean delegation to the Non-Aligned Conference had been able to gather. More, the incident, coming only a month before the U.N. 31st session of the General Assembly, was no doubt in part responsible for North Korea's decision to drop a proposal demanding "the immediate withdrawal of new types of weapons and military equipment, including nuclear weapons, introduced into South Korea."<sup>41</sup> Additionally, nations (such as Yugoslavia and Mauritania) that Kim had carefully cultivated during his spring 1975 trip, refused to sign as sponsors for the proposal, while some 24 participants at the Colombo conference had gone on record with their exceptions to the draft resolution written by the North Koreans.<sup>42</sup> Finally, the decision to drop the U.N. proposal may have been dropped because the U.S. had prior knowledge of the North Korean smuggling activities in Scandinavia and was prepared to divulge this knowledge



on the floor of the General Assembly before the story finally broke in the press in October. All in all, the elation of the diplomatic "triumphs" achieved in 1975 at the Lima non-aligned nations conference and the passage of the pro-North Korea U.N. resolution was quickly wiped out a year later, largely as a result of the August JSA incident and a possible international recognition that North Korea had not really changed her colors significantly over the past few years.

Once again during this latest Korean peninsula crisis Peking and Moscow almost certainly preached moderation to Kim. Peking remained publicly quiet on the incident,<sup>43</sup> an action tantamount to heavy disapproval. It has also been speculated that Pyongyang may have decided not to try to maintain an untenable stand because it had an inside line on developments in China, deciding that after the death of Mao the Peking leadership would be too preoccupied and possibly too divided to insure any form of effective support for North Korea if it got into trouble.<sup>44</sup>

North Korean foreign policy during the decade of the 1970's so far has reinforced Kim's attempts to remain neutral between the two battling giants. The attempt to remain essentially equidistant in this rift has not been an easy row to hoe, particularly as the operating environment has become more restrictive as the major powers have sought detente, a policy that demands peace and a modicum of

stability on the Korean peninsula. Kim Il-sung has also been cognizant of the continued low priority of Korean reunification in the eyes of his patrons, since any change in the status quo could have immediate and important effects deleterious to the big-power relationships. As a result, North Korea has been forced to pursue policies which may be described as "independent" in form, but tightly constricted in design to fit within the emerging political structure in North Asia, and the realities as they exist in the interactions of the fractured Communist world.

#### The Economic and Military Situation

The year 1971 saw the kickoff of the new Six-Year Economic Development Plan (1971-76) approved by the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. The plan, stressing rapid industrialization, was projected to achieve the highly ambitious target growth rate of 14% annually. Emphasizing the predominant role of development in the heavy industry sector, in line with the previous Five and Seven-Year Plans, the current plan's mode of execution reflects a probable underlying theme designed to further economic nationalism (self-sufficiency). The importance of the heavy industrial sector is reflected in the assignment of 40.7% of state investment to heavy industry, while light industry and agriculture were to receive 8.3% and 20% respectively.<sup>45</sup>

"Three technical revolutions" were embodied in the plan.<sup>46</sup> These involve efforts to: first, narrow the gap between heavy

and light labor; second, narrow the gap between industrial and agricultural work; and third, free women from household requirements as much as possible so as to augment the labor force. The major goal of the over-all plan is to strive for mechanization, semi-automation and automation to the greatest degree possible in all economic spheres to increase productivity and counter the deadlock posed by the continuing labor shortage. Priority would lie in production of machine tools<sup>47</sup> and in developing the power and mining industries.<sup>48</sup>

The guiding objective of the plan was a reinforcement of the gains in economic self-sufficiency that had already been made by stressing policies that would insure that the economy would become increasingly independent of outside sources of supply or influence. The development of power and mining industries would directly aid in this effort by increasing national self-sufficiency as North Korean leaders looked for the plan to achieve a 60-70% domestic production of raw materials.<sup>49</sup> The DPRK could realistically embark upon such a program because of internal sources of most raw materials needed for industrialization. The primary exception is oil, which at the beginning of the plan was imported primarily from the USSR. As production from the extractive industries (mining) and power production facilities increased, a deadlock would be broken by their new ability to keep up with the input requirements of the processing industries. Local industry would be greatly



expanded to take advantage of locally-available raw materials and labor, a scheme that would significantly minimize on transportation requirements. To aid in this development, consumer and light industry and agriculture were to get a greater proportion of state investment than in the past; however, development of heavy industry still retained the primary emphasis.

As a noted Sinologist visiting the DPRK in 1974 observed, "The virtues of modernization and advanced technology are blatantly obvious" to the North Koreans<sup>50</sup> and, unlike their Chinese neighbors, they seemingly have few qualms about obtaining the necessary equipment and technology to undertake the modernization process from outside sources. In the early 1970's Pyongyang began to look to the industrialized nations of the West for imports, primarily of modern technology, heavy equipment and industrial plants that would allow the North to compete with the developing South Korean economy. North Korean mineral exports were to be used as the primary products to repay the loans incurred to finance these imports.

Within the agricultural sphere (probably the weakest point in the national economy) similar ambitious plans were laid down as North Korea's leaders sought to achieve an annual growth rate of approximately 4%.<sup>51</sup> Since only about 20% of the DPRK is arable and the existing land is utilized to near-maximum, the North's agricultural plan is designed

to achieve greater production through intensification of agriculture. This intensification was to be accomplished through the greatly expanded use of irrigation, improved and more abundant fertilizers, and "all-around mechanization." These measures were deemed necessary to expand production to increase the general standard of living and raise state revenues for economic development. An August 1971 Nodong Sinmun editorial stated that it was important for the counties (within the provinces) to be the supply bases for the towns.<sup>52</sup> In other words, the countryside would be the foundation of industrialization.

The drive to achieve mechanization was also indicative of an endemic labor shortage. In terms of specific goals, the DPRK sought to increase grain production from the estimated level of 4.5 million tons in 1970<sup>53</sup> to 7-7.5 million tons at the end of the plan's period in 1976. Fertilizer production was to increase to approximately 3 million tons annually from a figure half that in 1970.<sup>54</sup> Only through a concentrated drive to mechanize could such goals have a hope of being achieved.

How has the North Korean economy fared since the inception of the current Six-Year Plan? According to the reports emanating out of Pyongyang the progress has been outstanding. On September 27, 1975 the Pyongyang Times reported that the Central Statistical Board has released statistics that showed that the annual gross industrial

output was 2.2 times higher than 1970 and that the annual rate of growth in industrial production had reached 18.4%, compared with the target 14%. Again, in agriculture, the harvest of 1974 was claimed to have exceeded 7 million tons of grain while 1975 was projected to have similar yields.<sup>55</sup> On September 23, 1976 Pyongyang made the claim that the 1976 harvest was the greatest yet, "bumper crops unparalleled in agricultural history."<sup>56</sup> Thus, it has been claimed that North Korea had attained the major goals of the plan more than a year ahead of schedule. However, in spite of the perennial bombastic claims of high success, there are other indicators that the economy is not moving forward as rapidly as desired. One of the telling indicators has been the growing problem of North Korea's trade deficit.

From a small trade surplus of \$18 million in 1970 the North Korean position soon became uncomfortable as a burgeoning deficit of \$500 million had evolved by 1973.<sup>57</sup> The deficit was mainly precipitated by a combination of rapidly inflating prices of imports, including the cost of oil purchased from the PRC and the USSR,<sup>58</sup> and was accompanied by falling raw materials prices, particularly North Korean metals, as the world market entered a recession phase in 1974 following the Arab oil embargo in the autumn of 1973. Other problems arose out of Pyongyang's unfamiliarity with Western business methods, an unfamiliarity largely due to North Korea's past isolation. Other problems



involved with invoicing in the pound sterling (rapidly falling in value throughout the 1973-74 period and to the present in the autumn of 1976), and inadequate harbor and shipping facilities combined with an underdeveloped infrastructure and transport system, proved to be the other major inputs affecting the financial woes and the DPRK's inability to meet their export commitments.<sup>59</sup>

By early 1975 North Korea was having difficulty meeting its loan obligations and shortly thereafter loan payments came to a stop altogether. North Korea thus had the distinction of being the first socialist country to fail in meeting its international trade obligations promptly. Estimates of the debts to non-Communist and Communist nations in the 1975-76 period vary: one source estimates the total to be in the range of \$700 million to \$1.7 billion;<sup>60</sup> another shows a total of \$430 million owed to non-Communist nations with a further amount of \$700 million owed to Communist creditors;<sup>61</sup> a third shows that by 1976 the Soviet Union alone may be owed as much as \$795 million;<sup>62</sup> and a fourth source puts Pyongyang's total debts at the end of 1975 at \$2.144 billion, of which \$1.242 billion is owed to non-Communist countries and \$902 million owed to the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup> Closer to home, the Japanese debt alone is authoritatively estimated at approximately \$260 million, of which \$60-70 million is overdue by the autumn of 1976.<sup>64</sup> Regardless of the precise dollar amounts of the debts, the

DPRK has encountered serious economic difficulties in meeting the obligations they have chosen to incur.

In apparent attempts to negotiate further loans the North Koreans evidently sought to borrow \$200 million from Iran in March 1975;<sup>65</sup> however, later reports indicate that the Iranians may have backed out of the deal.<sup>66</sup> Additionally, Kim Il-sung may have been successful in negotiating a cancellation of North Korea's outstanding \$150 million debt to China during his April 1975 trip to Peking.<sup>67</sup> In fact, some diplomats in Hong Kong felt that the prime motive force behind Kim's trip to China and Eastern Europe at that time may have been an attempt to partially solve the payments problem, rather than to seek backing for an attack on South Korea.<sup>68</sup> Reports also indicate that the Soviets have given the DPRK special terms for loan repayments by rescheduling the outstanding debts.<sup>69</sup> North Korean intransigence in arriving at agreement for repayment of the debts has already strained relationships with her creditors, particularly with Japan, and threatens to completely cut off an already substantially reduced international credit rating.

Only in late-September 1976 have the North Koreans again expressed what appears to be a sincere desire to negotiate their trade debts with Japan. The reasons for the sudden change in line may well stem from international events of the preceeding three months--the Panmunjom incident of August 18, North Korea's failure to win the

support of the non-aligned nations at Colombo, and the decision to drop its U.N. proposal when it became apparent that it would meet sure defeat.<sup>70</sup> The realization that determined truculence is unprofitable may have been the deciding factor. The outcome of this financial situation is still very much in question; however, the ramifications cannot help but impact on domestic economics.

Other indicators of a possibly faltering economy come from reviews of defense spending statistics, other economic figures, interviews with top KWP members, and by the statements of Kim Il-sung himself. As a percentage of state budget, defense spending has followed the following lines:

1970	-----	31%
1971	-----	30%
1972	-----	17%
1973	-----	15%
1974	-----	16%
1975	-----	16.4% <sup>71</sup>

While it must be kept in mind that these figures are official releases that tend to minimize expenditures on defense and defense-related items--some defense spending hidden within other areas of the budget--the trend seems to indicate a relatively stable level of expenditures. Despite the increasingly bellicose posture of the DPRK since 1974, possibly a function of a reported realignment of the power hierarchy in February 1974 in which military leaders advanced in rank, and because of an impasse in the North-South talks, defense spending has remained fairly constant. In the absence of hard information to confirm the proposition, it is speculative,



but logical, to consider that defense spending levels have not increased because of economic difficulties. This would seem to be borne out by Kim himself. Revealing that a line of thinking exists that equates defense spending to general economic development, Kim Il-sung, when interviewed by Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times in May 1972, stated: "Frankly speaking, because we had to divert large sums of funds to defense construction, we ran into difficulties--to an extent--in raising the people's living standards."<sup>72</sup> The relevance of the impact of defense spending on economic development revealed by this public admission illustrates its importance and may be indicative of a situation that exists several years after the interview was held.

Another economic indicator that provides evidence of slowdown, and possibly some reverses, in the growth of the North Korean economy comes from an examination of Gross National Product (GNP) expressed in constant dollars, military expenditures (MILEX) expressed as a percentage of GNP, and the GNP per capita (also in constant dollars).

Such an examination reveals the following figures:

YEAR	GNP (constant \$million)	MILEX (% of GNP)	GNP (per capita)
1970	5140	15.60	362
1971	5350	15.30	366
1972	5600	9.43	371
1973	5700	11.00	368
1974	5530	10.20	346 <sub>73</sub>

Examination of this table shows an upward trend in economic

factors until the 1973-74 period, at which time GNP per capita begins a downward movement as the population to GNP ratio increases. In 1974 the GNP shows a decided drop relative to the previous year's. Thus, this table indicates the possibility of an economic slowdown in the 1973-74 period; however, in the absence of hard data for 1975 and 1976, a determination cannot be positively made whether this is a transitory condition or a general downward trend in the economy. This data, however, does support the defense spending figures presented earlier and the proposition that such spending is being kept at low levels in order to keep from further straining the economy.

Additional impressions of economic difficulties have been obtained by visitors to the DPRK and by statements of Kim Il-sung himself. An American scholar who interviewed high KWP officials in Pyongyang in July 1974 was frankly told that North Korea had serious internal economic problems, particularly problems of labor unrest and of food shortages.<sup>74</sup> Another American scholar who had visited the DPRK a few months earlier had received similar information concerning economic difficulties.<sup>75</sup> Finally, Kim himself, in discussions with members of Japan's parliament in August 1975, indicated that the economy was not in good shape and that he wanted to reduce the defense burden.<sup>76</sup> From these various indications, it would seem that economic difficulties of a significant magnitude do in fact haunt the North

Korean economy despite the claims of great successes achieved during the current Six-Year Plan.

During the years since 1970 the armed forces of the DPRK have not increased greatly in numbers; however, there have been some significant additions to their weapon inventories that give them expanded military capabilities. From the following table it can be seen that the overall number of men under arms has increased somewhat, but that their numbers have remained relatively constant as a percentage of the population as a whole:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ARMED FORCES (total)</u>	<u>ARMED FORCES (per 1000 people)</u>
1970	438,000	30.80
1971	450,000	30.80
1972	460,000	30.50
1973	470,000	30.30
1974	470,000	29.40 <sub>77</sub>

From these figures and those of the following table which shows military expenditures in constant dollars and, again, the MILEX as a percentage of GNP, an interesting observation can be made:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>MILEX (constant \$million)</u>	<u>MILEX (% of GNP)</u>
1970	799	15.60
1971	819	15.30
1972	528	9.43
1973	625	11.00
1974	567	10.20 <sub>78</sub>

The observation is that with slowly-expanding force levels (manpower) and decreasing actual expenditures, particularly



the drop between 1971 and 1972 when expenditures dropped over one-third, the funds available for operation and maintenance of existing forces and the acquisition of new weapons must have been cut something approaching half of previous levels. By implication, since the Soviet Union is the DPRK's major supplier of major and relatively sophisticated weapons systems and supplies these primarily (if not entirely) on a loan basis, then it may be speculated that few major weapons acquisitions have been made and that existing forces are not only becoming more obsolete, but probably having some problems in maintenance areas, particularly in the area of spare parts.

Thus far in the 1970's only one major military agreement between the DPRK and one of her sponsors has been made public. That agreement followed a three-week visit from August 18-September 7, 1970 by North Korean chief of Staff O Chin-u to China. The agreement provided for nonrefundable military assistance, which it was believed, was bound for paramilitary forces that come under the "all-people and all-nation defense system."<sup>79</sup> Yet, beginning in 1973 the DPRK has received 9 ex-Chinese R-class ("Romeo" class) submarines from the PRC through 1976, now based on the Yellow Sea (west) coast.<sup>80</sup>

Similarly, the DPRK has been receiving some more advanced and sophisticated weapons systems from the Soviet Union. Through the early 1970's the North Korean naval inventory

only contained two ex-Soviet W-class ("Whiskey" class) submarines; however, by 1972-73 the figure had increased to three and by 1974-75 the figure had risen to four.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the Soviets supplied 14 high-speed missile boats, armed with the Styx anti-ship missile, in the 1972-73 period, and an additional four by 1974-75.<sup>82</sup> Additionally, the addition of 28 Soviet SU-7 jet fighter-bomber aircraft, supplied as a response to the U.S. providing F-4 fighters to South Korea,<sup>83</sup> was also a significant increase to the North Korean inventory although they are far from the most modern components of Soviet air forces. This growing naval strength could severely tax the South Koreans in the event of hostilities and could also pose a significant threat to U.S. naval forces operating in Korean waters. The addition of more modern aircraft to the North Korean air force also increases the quantitative, if not qualitative, edge over the ROK's air forces. The net effect of the addition of these newer systems on North Korean military capabilities is difficult to ascertain, particularly since there must be some tradeoff of a negative nature concerning the maintenance of other equipment growing steadily more obsolescent and acquisition of new equipment to replace it. Determination of the actual status of the North Korean forces and its combat capabilities has become more important since 1974 as it has appeared that the possibility of its employment against the South was greater than in the past several years.

The military situation on the peninsula has become somewhat more strained since 1974 after the quieter period since late 1969-early 1970. As mentioned earlier, North Korean aggressive actions steadily increased since 1974, culminating in the war scare in mid-1975 and the Joint Secretary Area incident in August 1976 when two American Army officers were killed. These actions, and the threat of action, have prompted strong U.S. statements of support for the South Korean nation in the event of North Korean military action and spelled out in fine detail the probable U.S. reaction to any such attack.<sup>84</sup> North Korean aggressiveness has also continued to focus attention on the ROK capability to "go it alone" without direct U.S. military support under conditions of a North Korean military attack--a capability that would almost of necessity be present before a U.S. military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would be undertaken. The American-sponsored ROK force modernization program, designed to be completed by 1975 and subsequently drawn out to the 1977-78 period because of U.S. funding considerations, is intended to insure South Korean capability to provide for its own defense.

Under the auspices of the current Six-Year Plan, the North Korean economy officially continues to make great headway in the development of a modern industrialized state. Beneath the propaganda, however, a somewhat less positive situation appears to exist--although the extent to which the



actual conditions very from the claimed is difficult to fix with certainty. Indicators, such as the current foreign trade deficit problem, military expenditures, and reports out of the North, all point to an economy that has major structural faults. A question of major relevance and significance becomes: is there any strong connection between the present state of the economy and the apparent changing North Korean attitudes which are manifested in a more belligerent line than that which existed in the early 1970's? And if there is, are conditions growing bad enough that a military operation against the South might be viewed as an acceptable risk? The ability to answer these questions with certainty would provide a valuable basis for forecasting North Korea's future international and reunification policies and predicting probable courses of action. For the present, a continuing careful examination of evidence as it becomes available piecemeal will have to suffice.

North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and Japan

To understand the actions that North Korea has taken during the first half of the 1970's in regard to South Korea, the United States and Japan, the impact of events that transpired within the Communist world have to be carefully considered. The growing estrangement of the PRC and the USSR, and the very real threat of war in 1969 had been a major, perhaps overriding, factor in pushing the Chinese toward rapprochement with the United States. The subsequent

announcement in July 1971 that President Nixon would visit China had made necessary a number of accommodations within the Communist world and, particularly in North Asia, between the Communist and non-Communist groupings.

North Korea's attitude toward Japan began to change as it became clear that in many respects an international situation of "every man [state] for himself" had developed. The Chinese move toward reconciliation with the U.S. implicitly required a similar move by the DPRK vis-a-vis Japan and the United States because of the close U.S.-Japan defense relationship and the exceedingly strong economic ties. For North Korea to remain in step with the Chinese and the Soviets it was incumbent upon the DPRK to also move toward some positive degree of accommodation with both of these "imperialist" foes.

In September 1972 China and Japan resumed diplomatic relations, just seven months after President Nixon's trip to Peking. In the Joint Statement that was issued at the conclusion of the negotiations, the two countries declared that neither would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and that both would oppose any such attempt by other nations or groups of nations--a virtual verbatim repetition of the February Shanghai Communiqué. Inclusion of this clause has resultantly placed Japan squarely in the middle of the contest between China and the Soviet Union, and the question of its inclusion in a Japan-China peace and friendship treaty

has been the major source of contention between the two states and thus far (November 1976), the greatest obstacle to the successful conclusion of that treaty.

China's diplomatic overtures to Japan were matched by the growing economic ties between the two nations. Increases in trade between the two countries was remarkable. By 1972 trade had risen to \$1.1 billion, by 1973 to \$2.015 billion and an estimated figure of \$3.5 billion in 1974.<sup>85</sup> The growing Japan-China relationship had significant impact on North Korea's policies.

On September 25, 1971, Kim Il-sung, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, made an obvious bid to begin a process of accommodation between the DPRK and Japan. This process, which began primarily as economic contact and trade relations (like the first contacts between China and Japan), was countenanced by the Japanese government in line with their pragmatic approach of separating economic interests from political considerations. In other words, since the Japanese government (as distinct from the Japanese people) were under recent and continuing verbal attack by the North Koreans because of their fear of a resurgent Japan that might seek to rearm and the perceived Japanese neocolonialism in South Korea, Tokyo remained aloof from these unofficial contacts by allowing them to proceed, but not providing overt political sanction or approval to the activities--though obviously they could not



have been undertaken privately without Tokyo's approval.

Pyongyang's efforts to achieve a workable political accommodation with Tokyo resulted in a significant concession when, in 1973, Kim made it clear to the Japanese that they would not have to abrogate the 1965 Japan-ROK Treaty when diplomatic relations are established between the DPRK and Japan. Although the concession was made (on the surface at least) to save Japanese "face," it was a major compromise since it implied a tacit acceptance of a "two Koreas" situation, a doctrine that is eminently distasteful to Pyongyang. The basis of this decision was the concept that Japan could have diplomatic relations with both the Koreas without jeopardizing Korean reunification<sup>86</sup> This was a concept totally in consonance with Secretary of State Kissinger's address at the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1975 in which he stated that "The United States supports the dual entry of both South and North Korea into the United Nations without prejudice to their eventual reunification,"<sup>87</sup> but to which Pyongyang has been otherwise consistently opposed because of the assertion that such a move would undermine the North Korean position as the sole representative of the Korean people. The inconsistency in policy generated by the approach to Japan would seem to indicate that the North Korean leaders felt that rapprochement with Japan was of considerable importance to long-term North Korean interests, particularly "to preclude the possibility

that Japan might replace the United States as the military protector of South Korea."<sup>88</sup>

To prevent such a possibility the DPRK has attempted to create a situation in which Japan is maneuvered into a more "neutral" position vis-a-vis the two Koreas. By committing the Japanese to increased trade and economic relations with North Korea, a more even-handed Japanese approach to the two Koreas could be obtained as a design to lessen support for the Southern regime. Japanese perceptions of this concept as a North Korean ploy were readily apparent when Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira remarked in November 1972 that "to treat North and South Korea on an equal basis diplomatically would be dangerous."<sup>89</sup> Quite obviously, Japan has far more interest in South Korea, particularly in an economic sense, than in North Korea and any such "equal" treatment would be far more to Pyongyang's advantage than to Tokyo's.

North Korean trade with Japan, as part of its campaign since 1970 to catch up with South Korea in the production of consumer goods and in technology, expanded rapidly. In that year the DPRK's total two-way trade amounted to some \$690 million while that of South Korea was \$2.8 billion.<sup>90</sup> The DPRK's trade with Japan and other non-Communist countries rose from 10% of its total trade in 1965 to 24% in 1973.<sup>91</sup> The trade just between Japan and North Korea was estimated at \$60 million<sup>92</sup> and after the signing of a five-year semi-official "memorandum trade agreement" on January 23, 1972,

the two sides foresaw the growth of trade exchanges to a level of approximately \$500 million annually by 1976. Since that time, as the North Korean trade deficit problem has loomed as a bigger and bigger factor in the economic relations of the two states, Japanese exports have fallen off drastically since August 1975 and the general atmosphere between the two countries, always rather cool and guarded, has become strained. A major factor that compounds the problem is that, unlike the European governments that have taken over the bad North Korean credits from banks and private creditors, in Japan it is the private sector that holds the claims.<sup>93</sup> Because of the complex nature of the underlying financial relationships between the two countries, if the Japanese government were to underwrite the Japanese traders and banks, the move would be tantamount to declaring Pyongyang an unreliable trading partner, a move that could not help but severely damage any developing accommodation between the two nations.<sup>94</sup> Thus, for the moment at least, private Japanese interests are left holding the bag. In the future it is probably going to require North Korean "cash up front" to induce further trade with these Japanese financial and business groups.

While the increased economic ties between Japan and North Korea to date have been primarily to Pyongyang's advantage as a source of industrial technology and goods, there are advantages accruing to Japan through the relationship beyond a favorable balance of trade (assuming of course



that North Korea pays her trade bills).<sup>95</sup> First, Japanese contact with North Korea will serve to blunt criticism from Pyongyang, and insofar as that contact does not substantially undermine South Korea's position or draw undue criticism from that source, will be valuable. Second, contact with North Korea would be useful in dealing with opposition parties and mass media, particularly the Korean population in Japan with its element that are sympathetic to Pyongyang. Third, through such contact North Korea may be eased further from her isolated position. And fourth, the development of closer ties with North Korea "forms a part of a Japanese diplomatic offensive"<sup>96</sup> that serves to constitute leverage against the Chinese in particular, and other nations as well (e.g., the Soviets and the Vietnamese).

The interactions between North Korea and Japan reflect a certain degree of autonomy that the two nations possess in dealing on the international scene. In the North Korean case, as has already been examined, the independent policy line has been actively sought in order to allow freedom and self-determination in decision-making for both internal and international policy formulation. In the Japanese case, while autonomy in decision-making and action has long been voiced and in most instances actively sought, it was not until the shokku of the announced Nixon visit to Peking that Japanese foreign policy in particular was singled out for a more independent (of Washington) approach. While the

growing independence of Japanese movement can hardly be denied, international conditions have been such that the Japanese policy direction is largely in consonance with that of the U.S., and ties between the two nations have been considerably strengthened and their outlooks brought into finer agreement after the events in Indochina in the spring of 1975.

Thus, the developing relationship between North Korea and Japan may be viewed as independent action, but action with roots in the Sino-American and Soviet-American detentes; action which is clearly supported and encouraged by the major powers as they seek to insure a modicum of stability on the Korean peninsula. The growing feeling of detente has allowed, and in fact encouraged, peripheral action to take place. At the same time it has placed pressure on the direct participants--the DPRK and the ROK--to reach some sort of accommodation among themselves that will result in peace on the peninsula (at least in the sense that there exists no open conflict that directly threatens to draw in the respective backers of the two Korean states) and eventually make possible a reunification of the two Koreas.

In the shadow of the mid-1971 announcement of President Nixon's intended visit to the PRC, and no doubt spurred by fears of great power collusion to decide the fate of the Koreas or freeze the existing situation, political activity between the North and the South began to take on a tone and

a substance that indicated the possibility of a settlement of the Korean question, or at least an approach to a settlement. On August 6, 1971, in a welcoming speech for Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Kim Il-sung held out the possibility of reconciliation when he suggested that members of all political parties in the North and South--including the ruling Democratic Republican Party--meet to discuss political issues. This proposal resulted in a South Korean counter-proposal that eventually led to the initiation of the Red Cross talks, intended to trace divided families and assist in their reunion. They were no doubt viewed more importantly as an opening dialogue between North and South.

In November secret contacts between the two Korean states began and led in turn to delegations meeting first in Pyongyang and then in Seoul for talks in May and June 1972. In a January 15 release from Pyongyang Kim still demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea; however, a change in policy appeared as he did not make this demand a necessary precondition for improved relations--thus setting the stage for further advancement in the on-going negotiations. The subsequent July 4 North-South Joint Communique was a largely unexpected event, particularly since it seemed to represent a major and unforeseen breakthrough in negotiations. Highlights of the communique in brief were:

- 1) reunification was to be achieved through independent Korean efforts without external interference;
- 2) reunification



was to be achieved through peaceful methods; and, 3) the issue of reunification was to be undertaken through efforts to elevate the question to a plane of broad national unity, above the mire of differences in ideology and social systems. Concrete results were the establishment of the North-South Coordinating Committee (NSCC) to oversee the efforts designed to create broad national unity, an agreement prohibiting each side from slandering the other, and the installation of a "hot line" (ala Washington-Moscow) between Seoul and Pyongyang.

The auspicious start of the North-South dialogue was not borne out by the ensuing events. Charges and counter-charges followed the joint communique as both sides engaged in the "what I really said" game. In early November the second conference of the NSCC Co-Chairmen was held in Pyongyang as the talks progressed at the preliminary lower levels and produced a statement calling for the cessation of all hostile propaganda on both sides. In the session that lasted from November 30-December 1 the first regular and full-scale meeting took place as the talks were upgraded from the preliminary negotiating phase. From these early meetings it became readily apparent that the two sides had two widely-divergent views of the reunification issue.

At the second session of the NSCC (March 15, 1973) the North Korean representative Park Song-ch'ol proposed a five-point peace treaty in order "to lift the confrontation

atmosphere hindering peaceful and independent unification." Specifically it was to end the Korean War, provide for a mutual reduction of forces and call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.<sup>97</sup> The South rejected this proposal and in a speech on March 20 President Park Chung Hee made the South's position obvious as he advanced the idea of a non-aggression pact. South Korea, it could be seen, viewed the reunification process as a long-term stage by stage process, while the North Koreans sought a near-term settlement to bring about reunification. As these two sharply divergent views came to the surface the negotiations became largely pro forma, and were broken off entirely after the apparently KCIA-executed kidnap on August 8 of South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel.

In November the Red Cross talks resumed and on December 5 the NSCC talks also began, albeit at the greatly reduced level of Deputy Co-Chairman. The Red Cross series of talks ran through the end of April 1974 with five such conferences convened; however, neither side was willing to make a move that would break the deadlock in negotiations. From the December 5 meeting, seven periods known as the Conference of Deputy Co-Chairmen of the NSCC here held through June 28, 1974--again with no breakthrough or advancement in the negotiations.

The breakdown in negotiations was accentuated by the

hard-line policy positions in the two capitols, effectively negating constructive initiatives and virtually insuring the failure of the talks to produce meaningful results. The conferences were continually downgraded to lower levels of representation and became arenas for the vituperative rhetoric between the two sides as relations generally deteriorated throughout the remainder of 1974 and into 1975. It was against this background of deteriorating negotiations between North and South, particularly after President Park's March 20 speech, that the DPRK, in an apparent attempt to break the deadlock on the Korean issue, made a direct approach to the United States on March 25, 1974 to explore the possibility of bilateral negotiations to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.

President Park had proposed a non-aggression pact to the DPRK and in this Korean ping-pong diplomacy the ball had come back disguised as an attempt to induce Washington to negotiate directly with Pyongyang--leaving Seoul out of the picture entirely. On March 25 the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly had approved a letter directed to the U.S. Congress in which a "peace" agreement was proposed. The letter proposed (in brief):

...(1) that each agree not to invade the other, and each avoid all the danger of direct armed conflict; (2) that each stop introducing weapons, combat equipment, or war supplies into Korea; (3) that the United States remove the U.N. insignia from U.S. troops stationed in the South and withdraw the troops "at the earliest date"; and (4) that each refrain from making Korea an operational base of any foreign country after the withdrawal of foreign troops.<sup>98</sup>



The offer for bilateral negotiations, had it been taken up by the United States would have quite severely undercut the position of the South Korean government. On the other hand, the inducement to negotiate offered by the North Koreans was not inconsiderable.

The question of concessions that the United States might realize from the DPRK was investigated during the summer. An American scholar, Dr. Andrew J. Nahm, ostensibly at the behest of the U.S. government, traveled to Pyongyang in July 1974 to sound out North Korean leaders on the proposals advanced in the March 25 letter. In a July interview with the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Secretary Kim Tong-gyu (number six at that time in the North Korean hierarchy<sup>99</sup> and director of the KWP International Affairs Department and vice-president), Dr. Nahm was told that to conclude a peace treaty with the United States, the DPRK would be ready to offer its guarantees that it would not seek to effect a military reunification of Korea.<sup>100</sup> Although the subsequent U.S. State Department reaction to the March 25 letter was rather cool and the official position posited that any resolution of the Korean problem must be undertaken by the two Koreas themselves, the DPRK's offer had been made, and as stated earlier, it was not an insignificant one.

North Korean policy vis-a-vis the U.S. throughout the 1970's has been characterized by the constant themes of

denouncing U.S. "imperialism" and demanding the withdrawal of all foreign troops--in particular the United Nations Command, composed of U.S. forces. In 1972, however, Kim Il-sung apparently sought to foster some new relationship with the United States, perhaps with an ultimate design of weakening domestic American support for a continued military presence in South Korea. In May Washington Post newspaperman Selig S. Harrison, and New York Times newspapermen Harrison E. Salisbury and John M. Lee were invited to the DPRK and permitted interviews with Premier Kim. While the New York Times interviews were illuminating, they served primarily as a sounding board for Kim's feelings toward the United States and his rationale for a U.S. withdrawal from the South. There was an interesting line of reasoning evident in one statement that reads as follows:

If in the past you said you needed military bases in South Korea to prevent the expansion of Communism, now that you have good relations with the big powers, why is there any necessity of having military bases in South Korea? <sup>101</sup>

On the surface it would seem that Premier Kim had either forgotten, or wished to ignore the fact, that his also was a Communist state!

The interviews also played on the Japanese presence in Korea as Kim asked why the United States wanted to turn Korea into "an appendage of Japan?" Kim's statement

So we can see the joint communique of 1969 between Nixon and Sato, and Nixon put forward the so-called Nixon Doctrine under which he instigated Japanese militarism so as to replace the United States in South Korea, so as to interfere in the internal affairs of the Korean people. <sup>102</sup>

By stressing "the occupation of South Korea" Kim Il-sung can be seen underlining the assertion made ad nauseum that the Southern regime is controlled by the U.S., and were the Americans to withdraw, the regime would surely collapse. If a simplistic outline was constructed of the North Korean strategy for reunification as it appeared to exist at the time of the March 25, 1974 peace proposal to the United States, it might take the following shape:

- (1) Reach a condition of detente with the United States.
- (2) Reach a condition of detente with South Korea.
- (3) As a result of the detente with North Korea, South Korea would perceive a lessened danger from the North and encourage the U.S. to withdraw from the peninsula.
- (4) South Korean independence would inevitably dissolve as a result of the regime's lack of U.S. backing and rising domestic pressure.
- (5) The DPRK would take over when the conditions were suitable.<sup>104</sup>

Thus, the North Korean efforts to effect a detente of their own can be seen not as efforts toward achieving a condition of peace per se, but as a political maneuver to deprive the South Korean government of its U.S. backing--a situation the North Korean leadership apparently feels will inevitably result in the collapse of the Southern regime. The U.S. refusal to deal directly with the DPRK, both in the summer of 1974 and again in the summer of 1975 when the North Koreans made overtures through Japanese Prime Minister Miki,<sup>105</sup> have manifestly deprived them of the opportunity



to make political gains at the expense of President Park's government.

The United States policy toward South Korea remains one of support, while there is a general realization by all parties--particularly since the U.S. Presidential election in November--that it is just a matter of time until the U.S. withdraws its military forces from Korea. The United States has refused the North Korean offers for bilateral negotiations, insisting that any negotiations dealing with the Korean issue must include both of the Koreas as active participants. Any attempt to arrive at a Four-Power (U.S., USSR, PRC, and Japan) or a Five-Power (the Four Powers plus Europe) agreement in Korea without inclusion of the two Koreas would be analogous to building a four-sided box around two scorpions. Adding a lid to the box (Europe) would do nothing more than close the container, leaving a continuing struggle within--in effect confining the combatants, but not ending the conflict. It would seem, then, that until the great powers and other interested and involved states arrive at some form of agreement which also includes the concerned combatants, there is little likelihood that the two Koreas will give up their present policies of mutual antagonism and confrontation. With this apparent consideration in mind the U.S. has openly sought the admission of two Koreas into the United Nations "without prejudice to their eventual reunification," a policy with which the Soviet Union has expressed tacit agreement through subtle nuances without openly stating its

approval for fear of driving North Korea further toward the Chinese who have openly opposed the "two Koreas" principle altogether in their support of the DPRK.

North Korea's foreign policy direction during the 1970's has reflected the great changes taking place in the international region of the Asian-Pacific region. The imminent danger of war between Russia and China in the late 1960's and their subsequent moves to arrive at detente with the United States along separate but parallel lines compelled North Korea to make dramatic shifts in her policy line as well. As independent in domestic and foreign policies as North Korea professes to be, there are still major considerations that limit her actual operational capabilities within the international system. North Korea is allowed room for maneuver between her two Communist patrons; however, as the preceeding has shown, there are increasingly stringent restrictions on her movement and choice of available policy options as a result of the developing relations and resultant political structures being built by the great powers. North Korea's policy goals, particularly Korean reunification, are of vital importance to Pyongyang; however, they are just not perceived with the same degree of importance in Washington, Moscow, Peking and Tokyo, as other priorities dictate actions that are often inimicable to the immediate interests of both Koreas. For these reasons the North Korean leadership has been forced to evaluate their situation

in the light of the emerging situation and take actions that neither threaten their independence nor compromise their long-term goals.

To do this Pyongyang has, through a policy of moderation in the early 1970's, sought to improve her international image as a responsible state, cultivate a role for herself within the Third World family of nations, and work to undercut South Korean status and legitimacy. Easing out of her isolation as the two-decade American policy of isolation ("containment") was left to dissolve, North Korea has sought increased contact with the world, and particularly with those nations capable of providing her with the economic assistance and modern technology deemed so necessary to compete successfully with the South in order to present a viable socialist alternative to the Korean people in the ideological struggle revolving around the efforts to effect a reunification of the peninsula. The growing belligerency of the North in the 1974-76 period, if viewed in this light, can be seen to be an aberration of sorts and a reaction of frustration to what the North Korean leadership must feel to be near-total South Korean intransigence on the reunification issue. North Korea's actions in these years since 1974 have been more rhetoric than action, and incidents such as occurred in August 1976 are more likely the result of local conditions than centrally-planned action. Even during the period of heightened tensions in the summer of



1975 there is little available evidence that supports the proposition that North Korea seriously considered the idea of a move south; quite possibly the rhetoric may have been designed as a political move to exact concessions from her backers in return for guarantees that the DPRK would not engage in military "adventurism" on the one hand, and as a destabilizing ploy vis-a-vis South Korea on the other.

North Korea's policies have reflected a pragmatic approach to accommodation with her sworn enemies--Japan and the United States. Through limited contact with Japan, North Korea has sought economic benefits while at the same time attempting to engineer a diplomatic maneuver to "neutralize" Tokyo by bringing about a situation in which Japan's dealings with the North will tend to minimize her contact with the South. Toward the United States, the DPRK's arch-enemy, softening of the belligerent line has most likely been pursued in recognition of the priorities Peking and Moscow have placed on peaceful relations with Washington, and the realization that the bellicose approach toward the United States in the late 1960's was totally counterproductive. Recent North Korean policy dealing with the United States would seem to indicate that the Pyongyang leadership is seeking to maintain a fairly low profile in the eyes of the U.S. in order to lower American perception of a North Korean military threat against the South, in the hope that such a view will lead to a decision to withdraw from the peninsula--

an objective that Kim has actively and unceasingly sought since Korean War days. Only after the condition of the U.S. withdrawal has been met can the North see the possibility for a reunification of the two Koreas. If this is the primary North Korean objective, then it would be tragically ironical if the carefully-cultivated hatred of the U.S.--so evident in the August 18 incident at Panumnjom--that was designed to defend North Korea and eventually lead to the elimination of the U.S. presence, would turn counterproductive and destroy the peaceful efforts to achieve just this very goal.

## NOTES: CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup>For the text of Chou En-lai's "Report on the Work of the Government" presented before the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 see Peking Review, No. 4 (January 24, 1975), pp. 21-25.

<sup>2</sup>For an analysis of the actions along the Ussuri River in March 1969 see Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes (RAND Report RM-6171-PR. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1970), pp. 33-40.

<sup>3</sup>Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle," Foreign Policy (Summer 1976), p.4.

<sup>4</sup>Donald S. Zagoria, "Mao's Role in the Sino-Soviet Conflict," Pacific Affairs (Summer 1974), p. 149.

<sup>5</sup>Roger Glenn Brown, op. cit., pp. 4-10.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup>Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," Asian Survey (December 1975), p. 1031.

<sup>8</sup>The New York Times, November 23, 1970, cited in Harold C. Hinton, "Chinese Policy Toward Korea," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), p. 22.

<sup>9</sup>Arnold L. Horelick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members," Pacific Affairs (Fall 1974), p. 276.

<sup>10</sup>Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Policy in East Asia," Problems of Communism (November-December 1973), p. 37.

<sup>11</sup>Cited in Joachim Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey (March 1976), pp. 205-06.

<sup>12</sup>For the text of the Shanghai Communique see Peking Review, No. 9 March 3, 1972), pp. 4-5; and, U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin (March 20, 1972), pp. 435-38.

<sup>13</sup>Arnold L. Horelick, op. cit., p. 277.

<sup>14</sup>For a further discussion of this point, see Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Policy in East Asia," op. cit., pp. 44-45.



<sup>15</sup>The New York Times, August 10, 1971, pp. 14-15.

<sup>16</sup>Cited by Young Whan Kihl, "Korean Response to Major Power Rapprochement," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea, op. cit., p. 144.

<sup>17</sup>See note number 23, *ibid*, p. 145.

<sup>18</sup>Parris H. Chang, "China's Foreign Policy Strategy: Washington or Moscow 'Connection'?", Pacific Community (April 1976), p. 414.

<sup>19</sup>Young Whan Kihl, op. cit., p. 146.

<sup>20</sup>B.C. Koh, "North Korea: A Breakthrough in the Quest for Unity," Asian Survey (January 1973), p. 87.

<sup>21</sup>Robert Whyment, "Panmunjom: Cutting Kim Down to Size," Far Eastern Economic Review (September 3, 1976), p. 9.

<sup>22</sup>Statement by Dr. Harry Harding, Jr., before the Special Sub-Committee on Investigations on November 18, 1975, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 39.

<sup>23</sup>Cited in Jane P. Shapiro, "Soviet Policy Towards North Korea and Korean Unification," Pacific Affairs (Fall 1975), p. 346.

<sup>24</sup>Parris H. Chang, op. cit., p. 417.

<sup>25</sup>John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," Asian Survey (November 1975), p. 965.

<sup>26</sup>From Kim Il-sung's welcoming banquet speech, April 18, 1975, in Peking Review, No. 18 (May 2, 1975).

<sup>27</sup>For the text of the Chinese-North Korean joint communique, see *ibid*, pp. 8-11.

<sup>28</sup>Bernard Gwertzman, "China Appears to Caution North Korea Not to Attack," The New York Times, May 29, 1975, p. 9.

<sup>29</sup>Drew Middleton, "North Korea Strengthens Border Force," The New York Times, May 23, 1975, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup>Richard Halloran, "War Scare Eases in Seoul, but Both Koreas Remain in a High State of Military Alert," The New York Times, June 12, 1975, p. 10.

<sup>31</sup>Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Tells Asian Allies U.S. Stands By Them," The New York Times, June 19, 1975, p. 1.

- <sup>32</sup>The New York Times, June 21, 1975, p. 8.
- <sup>33</sup>The New York Times, September 2, 1975, p. 22.
- <sup>34</sup>Bernard Gwertzman, "China Appears to Caution North Korea Not to Attack," The New York Times, May 29, 1975, p. 1.
- <sup>35</sup>Young C. Kim, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1975," Asian Survey (January 1976), p. 85.
- <sup>36</sup>Statement by Mr. A. Doak Barnett before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations on February 2, 1976, in United States-China Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations, op. cit., p. 159.
- <sup>37</sup>The New York Times, September 24, 1975, p. 14.
- <sup>38</sup>Peking Review, No. 49 (December 5, 1975), p. 8., cited in Parris H. Chang, op. cit., p. 417.
- <sup>39</sup>Allen S. Whiting, China and the United States: What Next? (Headline Series No. 230. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976), p. 24.
- <sup>40</sup>Robert Whyment, "Panmunjom: Cutting Kim Down to Size," op. cit., p. 8.
- <sup>41</sup>Louis Halasz, "Kim Avoids a Showdown," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 1, 1976), p. 16.
- <sup>42</sup>Ibid, p. 16.
- <sup>43</sup>Peter Weintraub, "Soothing Kim's Feathers," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 1, 1976), p. 70.
- <sup>44</sup>"Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 22, 1976, p. 5.
- <sup>45</sup>Richard F. Starr, ed., 1973: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p. 497.
- <sup>46</sup>B.C. Koh, "A Breakthrough...", op. cit., p. 91.
- <sup>47</sup>Ibid, p. 91.
- <sup>48</sup>Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part II: The Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 1264.

<sup>49</sup>Richard F. Starr, ed., op. cit., p. 497.

<sup>50</sup>D. Gordon White, "Report from Korea: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Through the Eyes of a Visiting Sinologist," China Quarterly (July-September 1975), p. 518.

<sup>51</sup>Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., p. 1157.

<sup>52</sup>Derek Davies, ed., Far Eastern Economic Review: 1972 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971), p. 253.

<sup>53</sup>Derek Davies, ed., Far Eastern Economic Review: 1971 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971), p. 248.

<sup>54</sup>Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., p. 1186.

<sup>55</sup>Richard F. Starr, Ed., 1976 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p. 319.

<sup>56</sup>Foreign Broadcast and Information Service [FBIS], Daily Report: East Asia and Pacific, September 23, 1976, pp. D9-11.

<sup>57</sup>Fox Butterfield, "Pyongyang Begins Effort to Pay Overdue Bills," The New York Times, August 8, 1975, p. 3.

<sup>58</sup>Edith Lenart, "A Vicious Circle for Pyongyang," Far Eastern Economic Review (December 19, 1975), p. 36.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid, p. 36

<sup>60</sup>Fox Butterfield, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>Edith Lenart, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>62</sup>Peter Weintraub, "Peking Keeps a Foot in the Door," Far Eastern Economic Review (July 16, 1976), p. 30; and, Peter Weintraub, "Soothing Kim's Feathers," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 1, 1976), p. 69.

<sup>63</sup>Susumu Awanohara, "Pyongyang's Time Runs Out," Far Eastern Economic Review (April 9, 1976), p. 38.

<sup>64</sup>FBIS, Daily Report: East Asia and Pacific, September 27, 1976, p. D8; and, Susumu Awanohara, "Pyongyang Looks for a Way Out," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 8, 1976), p. 42.



<sup>65</sup> Fox Butterfield, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>66</sup> Edith Lenart, op. cit., p. 37.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Weintraub, "Peking Keeps a Foot in the Door," op. cit., p. 30; and, Peter Weintraub, "Soothing Kim's Feathers," op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>68</sup> Fox Butterfield, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>69</sup> Peter Weintraub, "Peking Keeps a Foot in the Door," op. cit., p. 30; and, Peter Weintraub, "Soothing Kim's Feathers," op. cit., p. 69.

<sup>70</sup> Susumu Awanohara, "Pyongyang Looks for a Way Out," op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>71</sup> These defense figures are taken from various annual volumes of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press). Figures for 1970, 1971, and 1972 come from the 1973 Yearbook, pp. 497-98; for 1973, the 1974 Yearbook, p. 484; for 1974, the 1975 Yearbook, p. 368; and for 1975, the 1976 Yearbook, p. 319.

<sup>72</sup> The New York Times, May 31, 1972, p. 14.

<sup>73</sup> U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976), p. 35.

<sup>74</sup> Author's interview with Dr. Andrew C. Nahm at Western Michigan University, November 4, 1976.

<sup>75</sup> From a paper presented by Dr. Jo Yung-hwan at Western Michigan University on November 5, 1976 entitled "U.S.-Korean Relations as Seen from Socialist Countries."

<sup>76</sup> Richard Halloran, "North Korea Said to Ask U.S., Through Miki, for Direct Talks," The New York Times, August 10, 1975, p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 35.

<sup>79</sup> Richard F. Starr, ed., 1972 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 535.

<sup>80</sup>Raymond V.B. Blackman, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships: 1976-77 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd. 1976), p. 297.

<sup>81</sup>These figures come from examining succeeding volumes of Jane's Fighting Ships (see note 79 above) from the 1968-69 volume through the 1976-77 volume. This type of examination reveals yearly changes in the naval inventory and by inference gives some insight into the arms supplier and the rate of arms transfers.

<sup>82</sup>The examination of the numbers of missile boats in the DPRK's navy was undertaken with the same method described in note 80 above. The Soviet Styx missile has a range of 23-25 nautical miles.

<sup>83</sup>Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 12.

<sup>84</sup>For an examination of recent U.S. military strategy in the event of North Korean attack on the South, see Russell Spurr, "The Hollingsworth Line," Far Eastern Economic Review (February 27, 1976), pp. 26-28.

<sup>85</sup>Christopher Lewis, ed., Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1975 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1975), p. 22.

<sup>86</sup>Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, op. cit., p. 1023.

<sup>87</sup>The New York Times, September 23, 1975, p. 16.

<sup>88</sup>Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," Problems of Communism (January-February 1973), p. 66.

<sup>89</sup>B.C. Koh, "North Korea: A Breakthrough in the Quest for Unity," op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>90</sup>Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>91</sup>Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, op. cit., p. 1022.

<sup>92</sup>B.C. Koh, "North Korea: A Breakthrough....," op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>93</sup>Susumu Awanohara, "Pyongyang's Time Runs Out," op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>94</sup>For a discussion of this point, see *ibid*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>95</sup>For a more in-depth discussion of the following "advantages" accruing to Japan see Young C. Kim, "Japanese Policy Toward Korea," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea (Silver Spring, Maryland: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), pp. 53-58, particularly pp. 57-58.

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>97</sup>Koon Woo Nam, "North-South Korean Relations: from Dialogue to Confrontation," Pacific Affairs (Winter 1975-76), p. 479.

<sup>98</sup>Richard F. Starr, ed., 1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 370.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid*, p. 367.

<sup>100</sup>Author's interview with Dr. Andrew C. Nahm at Western Michigan University, November 4, 1976.

<sup>101</sup>The New York Times, May 31, 1972, p. 14.

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid*, p. 14.

<sup>103</sup>FBIS, Daily Report: East Asia and Pacific, January 28, 1974, p. D1, cited in Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>104</sup>Outline of North Korean action as spelled out by Dr. Jo Yunghwan at Western Michigan University, November 5, 1976 (see note number 74).

<sup>105</sup>The New York Times, August 1, 1975, p. 6; and, Richard Halloran, "North Korea Said to Ask U.S., Through Miki, for Direct Talks," The New York Times, August 10, 1975, p.8.



## CONCLUSIONS

The preceeding portions of this paper have been written to provide a foundation of events that have transpired in North Korea's foreign relations with the Communist bloc nations, the United States, Japan and South Korea over the past two and a half decades. The central theme of these relations has been a continuing attempt to chart an independent course of policy as a sovereign nation, and the primary objective has been to effect a reunification of the Korean peninsula. Expounding the principle of chuch'e, the DPRK has striven to achieve national self-reliance as a means to foster economic independence as the key to political autonomy.

From the Soviet-dominated satellite state of the late 1940's the DPRK, largely as a result of the Korean War and direct Chinese support, moved in the direction of free, independent action and by the late 1950's had largely cast off the cloak of Soviet suzerainty. As the Soviet Union appeared to be abandoning the vanguard position of the world Communist movement in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Pyongyang moved toward closer accommodation with Peking. The move toward China, occasioned by reasons of greater ideological affinity and security considerations, rapidly revealed itself as a bankrupt policy because of the DPRK's continued heavy dependence on outside economic and military support--support that China could not provide in sufficient quantity. The move back toward accommodation with the USSR

was matched by a complementary move away from the People's Republic of China as that nation entered the period of the Cultural Revolution and relations between the two countries receded to the lowest ebb in recent history. Finally, as China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution came to an end and the threat of war between China and Russia became a distinct possibility in mid-1969, Pyongyang patched up relations with Peking and maneuvered into a neutralist position, a position that the DPRK has carefully guarded to the present, albeit with the slightest shade of favor toward China.

This analysis has been undertaken with an eye to examining control factors in the DPRK-PRC and DPRK-USSR relationships. Despite the DPRK's uninterrupted efforts to maintain an independent, non-committed policy line, the reality of the international arena and North Korea's position within it, has mitigated against realization of this goal. Despite Pyongyang's extensive efforts to become nationally self-reliant, the nature of the country's economic development, the political environment and the military situation virtually guarantees a considerable degree of outside influence and interference in the affairs not only of North Korea, but also in those of South Korea, as the interests of the world's major powers all come into direct contact and contention on the Korean peninsula.

The fact that all the major powers are involved in the affairs of Korea inflates the situation there all out of

proportion, and by virtue of this focus of attention on the Korean peninsula, the possibility of a peaceful continuity of the present status quo is questionable with the attendant risk of an outbreak of hostilities. At the present, and in the foreseeable future, it would not seem to be in the best interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, or Japan, to become involved in warfare in, or over, Korea. By the same token, it would not appear profitable for either of the principals to attempt a military reunification of the country as a means to arrive at a solution to the problem.

What then, to ask the \$64 question, is the likelihood that the North Koreans would launch an attack against the South to effect a reunification of the peninsula? To assess this likelihood, it seems evident that a second question must also be asked. If it is assumed, as is generally considered to be the case at present, that none of the great powers are interested in a direct military attempt to reunify the nation, then what controls are used, or influences exerted, to see that North Korea does not "slip the leash" and make such an attempt? Any examination of such questions must take into account both the probable attitudes of the North Korean leadership toward such a venture, as well as outside pressures that come to bear to see that, insofar as possible, Pyongyang does not resort to this line of action.



The first input for consideration must be an examination of North Korean perceptions regarding the usefulness of military action to accomplish the goal of reunification, and what sort of conditions would have to exist before a determination would be made to resort to such means. If the hypothesis is posited that the North Korean leadership, regardless of possible factionalization and existing ideological learnings, is basically rational and reasoning, then the conclusion to be drawn is that the North Korean leadership is not likely to be self-destructive, in the sense that they would be unwilling to risk the nation's physical progress toward modernization and social "advancement" except under two widely-divergent conditions: a dire threat that raised the question of national survival, or the existence of conditions that would allow them to take military action with very low risk.

Since the Korean War the DPRK's actions have seemed to follow a policy that has minimized high levels of risk-taking that might induce an outside power (primarily the U.S.) to take direct counteraction. While such incidents as the seizure of the Pueblo in 1968, the downing of an American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft the following year, and the recent JSA incident in August 1976 might be pointed at to show militant, provocative intentions, it seems more likely (and as more evidence comes to light seems virtually certain) that each of these events was locally-initiated

action, executed without central direction or approval. If this is the case, then, as mentioned earlier, the policy of generating domestic hatred (directed primarily at the U.S.) that Kim and his leadership has created as a denominator of defense against a technologically superior foe may have backfired. More, these apparent undirected strikes against the U.S. presence became totally counterproductive to North Korean attempts to arrive at solutions to problems of vital concern by serving to intensify opposition and by generating additional outside hostility and distrust of North Korean intentions. What direct military action the DPRK has undertaken has primarily centered on infiltration and terrorist operations, and an unsuccessful effort to foster a revolutionary movement in the South. The hey-day of these efforts in the mid to late-1960's coincided with the preoccupation of the U.S. in Vietnam during a period that witnessed our heaviest commitment to that war. The timing of Pyongyang's efforts in this regard therefore minimized the risk-taking of these aggressive actions to levels that were considered acceptable. In determining attitudes of the North Korean leadership, the role that ideology assumes as it relates to the country's national interests and development must be considered.

A question of considerable significance is how "Communist" are the North Koreans? There is no doubt that the North Korean leadership under Kim Il-sung is deadly earnest in

their creation of an extremely tightly-controlled state established and run along Marxist-Leninist lines, but are they truly dedicated to the line they embrace, or are they paying it more lip service than subservience? Is Marxism-Leninism a tightly-embraced philosophy, or in actuality but a means to an end--a convenient casing for national self-reliance as embodied in the chuch'e concept?

External appearance and the conduct of domestic and external state affairs mitigate for true Marxist-Leninist leanings as the surface rhetoric of the leaders and the DPRK's relations with other Communist states so amply illustrates. The Marxist-Leninist line seems to be tempered with pragmatic approaches and application, however. In private meetings, as D. Gordon White points out in his observations, the following aspects come out: "In the realm of ideology, judging from conversations and visual impressions, there is little attention paid to Marx-Lenin."<sup>1</sup> Similarly, when questioned about the manner in which highly-placed North Korean leaders discussed matters, Dr. Andrew Nahm observed in his 1974 trip to Pyongyang that these officials spoke frankly without resort to dogmatic ideological phrasing and lines of reasoning, while those lower-level officials and professors at Kim Il-sung University with whom he had contact were most careful to maintain the doctrinaire line and mouth the appropriate ideological dialogue.<sup>2</sup> The implication is that adherence to Marxist-



Leninist ideology as a guiding philosophy is closely related to the answer given by North Koreans when questioned concerning their alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute by other Communists. The response, "The Korean side!," seems to indicate the strong nationalist tendencies vis-a-vis alignment with the Communist powers as a reflection of pragmatism in their concepts regarding the usefulness of Marxist-Leninist ideology. If this is in fact the case, then the following may be taken under consideration.

Primarily, then, ideology is not viewed as dogma. The North Koreans go to great lengths to denounce Soviet "revisionism" and Chinese "dogmatism." The principles upon which the North Koreans operate in furtherance of their own perceived national interests may not be primarily framed by, or executed under, considerations imposed by Marxist-Leninist mores. It may be viewed as Communist ideology, perhaps, but only if understood in terms of Tito's free-lance Yugoslavian style as opposed to the rigidly-interpreted Chinese Marxist-Leninist line for example. If Marxist-Leninist dogma is viewed as influencing, but not necessarily controlling decision-making and policy implementation, then a different set of rules must apply in analyzing the actions of North Korea.

What then are the factors that govern the manner in which Pyongyang operates? Is it then this nationalist chuch'e principle? Chuch'e in combination with Marxist-

Leninist ideology? Kim's personal foibles? A combination of the three? The list of possible variables resulting from these input sources which determine and influence policy formulation and implementation are inexhaustive; therefore it seems more valuable to examine what we may consider to be likely long-term collective goals than search to track down individual influences which, conceivably, could become important policy-determining factors, but which cannot be traced with surety or foreknowledge that they will be meaningful inputs. The key to further North Korean actions, it would seem, lies within the following analogy: Communism, more properly Marxist-Leninist ideology, provides the vehicle (or casing) for action, while nationalism (expressed in the chuch'e philosophy) provides the motive power to direct effort toward achieving long-term goals. The long-term goals might include the following: a singular desire to achieve the greatest possible degree of national independence and autonomy, free from foreign domination or influence; a desire to effect a reunification of the Korean nation and a desire to project pride in the Korean race, culture and traditions as a national ideal.

It seems unlikely that Kim Il-sung and other members of the leadership elite (except perhaps for the inevitable dialogues) are truly striving for the formation of a Communist state as the end in itself--merely as means to an end. Neither can nationalism be more than a motive force

propelling North Korea forward toward a defined purpose. Nationalism without defined goals is like an unfinished symphony: a great expenditure of directed effort with no established conclusion. The end product, therefore, must be goals such as I have already outlined, though not necessarily or inclusively these particular ones. And ultimately, all North Korean planning and action must be governed by these considerations if we make the judgment that the DPRK's leadership, personified in Kim Il-sung, is moderately rational and not dedicated to self-destructive aims--a line of reasoning that has been the apparent case in the past since North Korea's bitter and tragic experience in the Korean War.

Available courses of action that the Chinese and the Soviets can employ to encourage North Korean compliance with their desires for "peaceful reunification" methods take the forms of economic measures, political sanctions, and degrees of military aid and support. In the economic sector, the USSR has a decided advantage over China in the ability to apply "persuasive" measures to "encourage" co-operation and agreement. The Soviet Union still remains by far and away the largest trading partner of the DPRK despite North Korean efforts to diversify trade patterns and reduce dependence on any one nation. Because of this heavy dependence, the Soviet Union has considerable leverage over the North Koreans. If the USSR so elected, they could



unilaterally restrict North Korean exports through any one of a number of methods such as import quotas, tariffs, and the like--moves that could have a crippling effect on the economy. Likewise, through restriction of certain key Soviet exports to North Korea, such as oil and machinery, considerable damage could also be inflicted in this way.

An economic area in which both the Soviet Union and the PRC have had a hold on North Korea is that of the creditor-debtor relationship. Again in this area the Soviet Union possesses more leverage than Peking, primarily because of the greater levels of trade between the USSR and the DPRK. If, as has been speculated, North Korea was successful in getting China to wipe the slate clean of some \$150 million in outstanding debts when Kim Il-sung visited Peking in April 1975, then this particular hold has been wrested from China's grip, although the price of canceling that debt may have been a North Korean guarantee not to strike southward. On the other hand, the large notes held by the Russians give them considerable sway in this regard. If the North Koreans did succeed in renegotiating these debts to Russia as previously advanced, then it might be speculated that the Russians probably exacted considerable concessions from the North Koreans, given the sums involved in the DPRK's outstanding debts to Moscow. It is safe to assume that the terms of any loans that either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic may choose to underwrite in the future

will be directly linked to Pyongyang's evident willingness to toe the mark, at least insofar as it does not exact too great a political cost to North Korea or seen by the DPRK as a threat to their independence.

At the present it appears that the Soviet Union holds a decided advantage over Communist China in their ability to wield economic influence, and therefore political power. The North Korean reaction to this economic dominance has been characterized by attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in areas of vital importance. Thus the current Six-Year Plan's emphasis on developing the extractive and power industries to lessen dependence on foreign sources of power and fuels may be seen as an attempt to realize this objective. Until domestic sources of power sufficient to provide for the country's needs are developed, a trend seems to be developing toward diversification of sources, in particular petroleum products. Already North Korea is heavily dependent on China for oil imports,<sup>3</sup> and in January 1976 the Korea-China "Friendship Oil Pipeline" project was inaugurated,<sup>4</sup> presumably to increase the supply. As apparent evidence of its goodwill, China disrupted oil shipments to Japan early in 1976 to provide for North Korean needs.<sup>5</sup> As the DPRK becomes more heavily dependent on China for all imports, China will have increased leverage in its dealings with North Korea. On the other hand, if North Korea had succeeded in cultivating sources of supply from both her

patrons, then her position becomes vastly better than being dependent on one, since one can be played off against the other.

In terms of being able to bring economic coercion to bear to influence North Korean decision-making, it appears that the Soviet Union still remains in a better position to bring pressure to bear than does China. If the North Koreans can succeed, however, in becoming domestically more self-sufficient while simultaneously diversifying their sources for vital imports they will be better able to resist external forces that seek to influence their policies--unless there is concerted action by both backers to dissuade Pyongyang from taking actions considered inimicable to the interests of both, such an attack on the South, for instance. In the area of political constraint designed to discourage any untoward North Korean action, the PRC seems able to bring influence to bear as great as that of the Soviet Union.

The nature of political sanctions that can be used to encourage coincidence in apparent political outlook and similarity in action are numerous. As discussed earlier, the PRC and the USSR seem to hold dissimilar views of their alliance relationship with North Korea. Neither of Kim's patrons are probably overjoyed over their dealings with him. His seeming unpredictable nature and past mercurial behavior as an ally cannot help but be viewed in Moscow and Peking as the mark of a man who cannot be trusted any further than



either Brezhnev or Hua can throw him. However, the reality of the situation is that Kim must be dealt with and both Communist giants actively seek to cultivate his cooperation and backing, and seek to keep him from taking action that might draw them into conflict or military confrontation with the United States, and indirectly, Japan. China's approach to the problem may be seen as one of trying to deal with Kim on his own level, of trading revolutionary slogan for revolutionary slogan and attempting to "cement" the blood relationship between the two nations without having it come to that. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, seems to shy away from a relationship that is too close and familiar with Pyongyang, instead maintaining a cooler, more distant relationship.

In their support for the DPRK, both the Chinese and the Russians have strongly backed the North's cause in the United Nations. In this way both have backed the North Koreans within the international diplomatic community, thereby providing valuable assistance to North Korea's attempts to undercut the legitimacy of South Korea's regime and raise her own stature in the world family of nations. No doubt the Chinese and Soviets both hope that increased diplomatic exposure will have the effect of moderating Pyongyang's views. North Korean refusal or reluctance to follow Moscow and/or Peking's lead on important matters could result in the dissolution of support in this world body and an increased

degree of diplomatic isolation. The Soviet contacts with South Korea in 1974-75 showed how easily the Soviet Union could damage North Korea's position, particularly vis-a-vis the "two Koreas" issue.

In this area Pyongyang decidedly has a greater friend in Peking than in Moscow. Peking's unequivocal support for North Korea's claim as the only true Korean government and sole representative of the Korean people in the April 1975 China-North Korea joint communique stands in marked contrast to Moscow's silence on the issue; a silence that probably expresses disapproval, but one which will probably remain largely unspoken to keep from driving the DPRK off to seek increased Chinese support. Both Russia and China can use this issue as a control over North Korea because of the vital position this proposition holds in the DPRK's claim to sole legitimacy in Korea. Minor Soviet interactions with South Korea carry weighty implications and create uncertainties concerning probable behavior and support,<sup>6</sup> particularly the dangerous possibility that the USSR might go so far as to recognize South Korea. China, if it were to forego the statements of the April 1975 communique at some future date for more immediate considerations, would be able to exert similar influences. Likewise, both China and Russia can exhibit considerable support for North Korea, if they so choose, by resolutely opposing any approach to a "two Koreas" solution to the Korean question.

The third major area in which the USSR and the PRC can influence North Korea is in the area of military support and aid. As in the economic sphere, the Soviet Union enjoys a distinct advantage over China and "The Soviet Union's ability to supply advanced weapons to...North Korea...may be its strongest level is competing for influence with Peking."<sup>7</sup> North Korea remains tightly bound to the Soviet Union for supplies of heavy equipment and sophisticated weaponry, while the PRC-supplied arms in the past have been primarily simpler in manufacture and sophistication (such as infantry weapons, for example), although China's supplies to North Korea have increased in recent years and in 1972 exceeded those supplied by the Soviets and have included such items as MIG-21 aircraft and T-59 tanks.<sup>8</sup> Again, it seems that the North Koreans have made efforts to diversify their source of supply; however, it is unlikely that China will be willing to part with significant amounts of newer and more sophisticated military arms because of chronic shortages within her own forces.<sup>9</sup> For that reason the Soviet Union will probably continue to be the major supplier, although they have not been willing to provide North Korea with new, first-line equipment similar to that being supplied to some of the Arab nations; perhaps as a quietly managed arms control program. There is the possibility that North Korea could break away from her sponsors and seek modern weaponry on the world arms market--



a move that would probably be ill-received by the Soviets on the one hand, and by probable reluctance on the part of suppliers to deal with North Korea for political reasons and for economic reasons associated with North Korea's growing reputation of unreliability as a trade partner.

Because of North Korea's dependence on the USSR and the PRC for arms imports she is vulnerable at all times to being cut off from further shipments, particularly continued delivery of spare parts for existing weapons. Dependence on a single source of supply is an exceedingly uncomfortable position to occupy when national security is largely dependent upon continued deliveries. The Egyptian experience following her recent break with Russia is an excellent case in point. The cessation of further shipments, particularly spares, required Egypt to seek assistance from India, and when that effort was unsuccessful, required Egypt to accept a Chinese offer to provide spare parts for Egyptian MIG-21s. North Korea is in a similar boat because of its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union; however, it too does have the current option of being able to go to China for assistance, limited as that assistance might turn out to be.

The other attendant element of military backing is the degree of direct support the DPRK can expect to elicit from China and Russia in the event of an attack by virtue of her two mutual defense treaties. It seems likely at this time that any such direct intervention by either sponsor would

come only through an external assault on the North, and that support of a southward move would be unlikely to be forthcoming. In many scenarios, however, particularly if a border clash got out of hand, it might be difficult to make a determination of who attacked whom, and the signatories to these treaties might find themselves drawn into a conflict in which they want no part. Since their treaty positions are quite similar to the U.S. commitment to South Korea--with the vital exception that the U.S. has troops in Korea that almost certainly would become embroiled in any significant action involving North and South Korea--they could quickly be drawn into a conflict situation. By being physically detached from the Korean peninsula, however, the potential for a careful examination of the situation is present and affords time before a requirement might exist that would require direct intervention. This is an option that the U.S. does not presently enjoy because of the current "trip wire" concept emanating out of the 2nd Division's deployment between the DMZ and Seoul with a small forward element positioned along a short length of the DMZ at Panmunjom.

The Soviet and Chinese backing and the structure of the respective mutual defense treaties reinforces the statements of these two countries as they expound the virtues of "peaceful reunification." Pyongyang's apparently chronic sense of insecurity will probably remain for at least as

long as the U.S. military presence remains in South Korea, because of the DPRK's long-held view that the U.S. is the greatest threat to their security and that, as a result, war is perpetually imminent. For this reason, the North Koreans remain tightly bound to the Soviets and the Chinese to provide the guarantees of support in the event of a U.S.-ROK attack on the North. By the same token they are pressured to take to heart the "peaceful reunification" approach, or chance the loss of this backing.

This foregoing discussion is by no means exhaustive in depth or scope. It is intended, however, to give a feel for some of the factors which the Soviets and the Chinese can manipulate to encourage North Korean compliance with their policies and interests. Clearly, the DPRK's interests are of secondary importance to those of her two patrons, and because of that, the DPRK will necessarily have to sublimate some aspects of her policies to remain within the guidelines which have been set out for her. The reality of the international situation has remained largely unchanged for North Korea over the years. Despite advocacy of the chuch'e philosophy in attempts to become self-reliant and achieve political autonomy and independence of action, the country still remains heavily dependent of the policies and actions of the two Communist powers--China and Russia--and in the foreseeable future that situation is unlikely to change drastically.



For the reasons that I have set out above--an assumption of rationality and reason in the North Korean leadership, the contention that ideology and attainment of a Communist state is not an end in itself, and that the Soviet Union and China do wield powerful means to influence North Korea's decision-making--I feel that a North Korean attempt to effect a military reunification of Korea is highly unlikely, and that if any such attempt should ever occur, it would result from a set of circumstances that either directly threaten the national survival of the DPRK or which involved a very low level of risk in taking such action. It remains within the power and the capabilities of the United States to see that neither set of circumstances will arise in the future.

## NOTES: CONCLUSIONS

<sup>1</sup>D. Gordon White, "Report from Korea: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Through the Eyes of a Visiting Sinologist," China Quarterly (July-September 1975), p. 515.

<sup>2</sup>Author's interview with Dr. Andrew C. Nahm at Western Michigan University, November 4, 1976.

<sup>3</sup>Selig S. Harrison, "China: The Next Oil Giant," Foreign Policy (Fall 1975), pp. 15-16.

<sup>4</sup>Lynn Yamashita, "A Return for Their Money," Far Eastern Economic Review (July 30, 1976), p. 46.

<sup>5</sup>Peter Weintraub, "China: Ideology, then Oil," Far Eastern Economic Review (June 18, 1976), p. 37.

<sup>6</sup>For an interesting discussion of the alliance relationships between the DPRK and the USSR and PRC, and between the U.S. and South Korea, see Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances," World Politics (July 1973), pp. 508-32.

<sup>7</sup>Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 148-49.

<sup>8</sup>Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976) p. 15.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, pp. 15-16.

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